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This thesis answers the fundamental questions of what North Korean capabilities and
intent in cyberspace are and what North Korean threats and vulnerabilities are associated
with these. It argues that although North Korea’s cyberspace resources and capabilities
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION

North Korea has been a constant national security challenge for the United States.
For decades, it has pursued nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development in violation
of treaties, agreements, and norms, threating peace and stability in East Asia. It has also
emerged as a threat in cyberspace. It has been implicated in numerous cyberspace
operations against the United States and South Korea. In a statement before the Senate
Armed Service Committee, Admiral Michael Rogers, commander of United States Cyber
Command, listed North Korea among the nations of greatest concern in cyberspace.1
However, the threat in cyberspace that North Korea poses is not well understood at worst
and not well articulated at best. It is also assumed that because North Korea has no
significant reliance on the internet, it possesses no significant vulnerabilities in
cyberspace. These misunderstandings and assumptions are due to the difficulties created
by the secretive nature of North Korea and the nascent and dynamic nature of cyberspace.
This thesis will answer the fundamental questions of what North Korean
capabilities and intent in cyberspace are and what North Korean threats and
vulnerabilities are associated with these. The thesis will begin by introducing the research
approaches and challenges, as well as the significance of adversary activities and
operations in cyberspace in chapter one. Chapter two will provide background on conflict
in cyberspace, North Korea’s national security environment, and North Korea’s
conventional capabilities and strategy. Chapter three will discuss the frameworks and

1

Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee. Statement of Admiral Michael S. Rogers, Commander,
United States Cyber Command, before the Senate Armed Services Committee, by Michael Rogers. 5 April
2016. Web.
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methodologies used for subsequent analysis. Chapter four will analyze the threats and
vulnerabilities associated with North Korea as evidenced by its cyber power, which
includes its resources and strategy. Chapter five will analyze the threats and
vulnerabilities associated with North Korea as evidenced by cyberspace operations both
by it and against it. Chapter six will discuss the subsequent conclusions. The thesis will
conclude by discussing the United States national security implications of this analysis
and providing policy recommendations in chapter six.

Arguments
Valerians and Maness propose a theory of cyber restraint and regionalism,
claiming that most state interaction in cyberspace can be characterized as limited to
restrained offensive cyberspace operations or cyber espionage and focused between
regional actors.2 To test this theory, the authors compiled the Dyadic Cyber Incident and
Dispute Dataset (DCIDD), which covers cyber events from 2001 to 2011. However, there
have been numerous events involving North Korea since then. This thesis argues that
consistent with the theory, cyberspace operations by North Korea have remained focused
primarily on South Korea over the United States and limited to offensive cyberspace
operations and cyber espionage with minimal effect on South Korean and United States
national security. It also argues that traditional disruption or denial approaches to
cyberspace operations against North Korea, which have allegedly targeted strategic
programs inside North Korea, focus on the wrong asset. Although North Korea values

2

Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness. Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the
International System. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015. Print.
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these programs, it also values its ability to control cyberspace within North Korea and its
ability to engage in cyberspace activities and operations from abroad. These arguments
are formalized as follows:
•

Hypothesis 1: North Korea’s cyberspace resources and capabilities have
increased and have now reached a level that represents an advanced persistent
threat.

•

Hypothesis 2: Despite this increase, North Korea’s cyberspace operations
have remained restrained (produced minimal effects on South Korean and
United States national security) and regional (targeted South Korea over the
United States).

•

Hypothesis 3: North Korea’s valuable assets include its ability to control
cyberspace within North Korea and its ability to engage in cyberspace
activities and operations from abroad.

Research Approaches and Challenges
The main challenge for this thesis is finding reliable and/or verifiable information
on North Korean cyberspace activities. Attribution in cyberspace is difficult, and entities
affected by malicious activity are often reluctant to disclose information for various
reasons. North Korea in particular is secretive by nature and reveals little information
about itself. However, there are various methods for attribution, and most cyber events
that are significant enough to be relevant for analysis often have information released by
government authorities and/or network security companies. In fact, because events can
affect both military and civilian entities and direct evidence can be left behind on the
systems and networks of these victims, analysis can actually be easier. Although North
Korea maintains strict control over information, there are also human sources with direct
and indirect access to this controlled information.

3

In addition, there is the challenge of addressing “creeping validity” and “threat
inflation.” In the former, “possibly” becomes “likely,” “likely” becomes “certainly,” and
a presumption becomes established as a conclusion without any new evidence having
been introduced.3 In the latter, through misunderstanding or misrepresentation, concern
for a threat is created that goes beyond the scope and urgency that is justified by informed
and impartial analysis.4 When an attempt at simply probing or phishing is described as a
“cyberattack” or a “hack,” and a suspicion or an assumption regarding the identity of the
perpetrator is presented as a conclusion, the available information must be carefully
analyzed.

Significance
Activities related to cyberspace, such as offensive cyberspace operations, cyber
exploitation, cyber espionage, and cybersecurity are a concern not only for the United
States, but also for the international community. A review of the United Nations
resolutions related to cyberspace provides evidence for the increasing significance of
these activities; from simply preventing the misuse of information technologies in 2001,
to eventually creating an international culture of cybersecurity and accounting for
national efforts to protect critical information infrastructures in 2010.5 Despite this
increasing significance, however, cybersecurity efforts are still lagging. As of 2017, only

3

Clarke, Richard and Robert Knake. Cyber War: The Next Threat to National Security and What To Do
about It. New York, NY: Harpers Collins Publishers, 2010. Print.
4
Thrall, Trevor and Jane Cramer. American Foreign Policy and the Politics of Fear: Threat Inflation since
9/11. New York, NY: Routledge, 2009. Web.
5
“UN Resolutions Related to Cybersecurity.” International Telecommunication Union, N.D. Web.
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38 percent of countries have published a cybersecurity strategy and only 50 percent are in
the process of developing a strategy.6
Cyberspace is especially significant for the United States. According to a
statement by the former Director of National Intelligence, James Clapper, “[cyberspace]
is both a resource on which our continued security and prosperity depends and a globally
contested medium within which threats manifest themselves.”7 Within cyberspace, the
United States considers North Korea (in addition to Russia, China, and Iran) to be among
the most concerning of these threats. According to the Worldwide Threat Assessment of
the US Intelligence Community:8
[North Korea] has previously conducted cyberattacks against US commercial
entities—specifically, Sony Pictures Entertainment in 2014—and remains capable
of launching disruptive or destructive cyberattacks to support its political
objectives. [North Korea] also poses a cyber threat to US allies. South Korean
officials have suggested that North Korea was probably responsible for the
compromise and disclosure of data in 2014 from a South Korean nuclear plant.
To maintain security and prosperity, understanding and addressing North Korean
activities in cyberspace is a concern for both the United States and the international
community.

6

“Half of All Countries Aware but Lacking National Plan on Cybersecurity, UN Agency Reports.” United
Nations, 5 July 2017. Web.
7
Congress, Senate, Armed Services Committee. Foreign Cyber Threats to the United States, by James
Clapper. 5 January 2017. Web.
8
Congress, Senate, Select Committee on Intelligence. Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community, by Daniel Coats. 11 May 2017. Web.
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CHAPTER II: BACKGROUND

Cyberspace operations, which refers primarily to government actions that are
associated with a specific national goal, do not occur in isolation. All operations, both in
cyberspace and traditional domains, occur within the context of an established national
security environment. It is the perceived internal and external threats that comprise this
environment and that motivate national capabilities and strategy, of which cyberspace is a
single aspect. As such, to understand North Korea’s cyberspace operations, it is necessary
to understand its conventional capabilities and strategy as well.

Conflict in Cyberspace
The actors behind the malicious activity in cyberspace are diverse and include any
individual or group with the capability and intent. Although the lines are sometimes
blurred, the greatest distinction in regard to capability and intent can be made between
state and non-state actors. State actors often have a capability that is more advanced and
an intent that is more related to political or military goals.
Because the norms of behavior in cyberspace have not yet been established or
codified, the nature of the interaction between state actors is ambiguous. The greatest
ambiguity is whether certain malicious activity constitutes a cyberwar or whether it could
even be considered an act of (traditional) war. Although there is much debate about
whether a cyberwar will occur, there is some agreement that it has not yet occurred and

6

that the malicious activity in cyberspace between state actors constitutes cyber conflict at
worst, remaining restricted in scope and intensity.9, 10
A distinction in regard to the malicious activity that does occur can be made
between exploitative incidents and disruptive incidents, which differ by ultimate effect.
In an exploitative incident, sensitive information or data is compromised. This is
commonly referred to as cyber espionage. In a disruptive incident, physical or virtual
operations are hindered. These are commonly referred to as offensive cyberspace
operations. These respective incidents are not mutually exclusive, as cyber espionage is
often preparation for an offensive cyberspace operation. A policy brief from the Center
for International and Security Studies at Maryland suggests that most incidents are
exploitative and even for those that are disruptive, the scope, magnitude, and duration of
most incidents constitutes a nuisance at worst.11
Among the actors in cyberspace, there are some that are considered an advanced
persistent threat (APT), in contrast to a traditional threat. Opinions on the characteristics
that constitute an APT are varied. According to the rather extensive definition provided
by the National Institute of Standards and Technology, there are four distinguishing
characteristics of an APT: (1) specific targets and goals, (2) high degree of organization
and high amount of resources, (3) extended operations and repeated attempts, and (4)
stealth and evasive techniques.12

9

Rid, Thomas. “Cyber War Will Not Take Place.” Journal of Strategic Studies 35.1 (2012): 5-32. Web.
Stone, John. “Cyber War Will Take Place.” Journal of Strategic Studies 36.1 (2013): 101-108. Web.
11
Gallagher, Nancy and Charles Harry. “Categorizing and Assessing Disruptive Cyber Incidents.” College
Park, MD: Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland, April 2017. Web.
12
Chen, Ping, Lieven Desmet, and Christophe Huygens. “A Study on Advanced Persistent Threats.” IFIP
International Conference on Communications and Multimedia Security 2014. 25-26 September 2014. Web.
10
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Malware and malicious code are the main weapons of cyberwar and cyber
conflict. Although malware and malicious code are often synonymous with each other,
the former can be thought of more as a program and the latter more as a script. There are
three basic types of malware and malicious code that are classified based on the nature of
propagation and execution: (1) trojans, (2) viruses, and (3) worms.13 A trojan is piece of
malware that is disguised as a legitimate program but also performs a function that is not
authorized by the user, hence the name. It is unable to self-replicate, requiring that an
unsuspecting user execute it. Although viruses and worms are able to self-replicate, a
virus is executed by being attached to a host program and a worm is not. From here,
further classification becomes complicated. The functions of malware and malicious code
are varied and not restricted to a certain type. Individual malware and malicious code can
have multiple functions and the various types can be embedded within each other. In
general, however, malware and malicious code can be used to provide remote-access (ex:
backdoors), monitor, collect and exfiltrate data (ex: packet sniffers, listeners, and
keystroke loggers), modify or destroy data (ex: logic bombs and wipers), download or
deploy additional malware (ex: downloaders and droppers), or conceal activities (ex:
rootkits).
Attribution of malicious activity in cyberspace is notoriously difficult. There are a
few reasons for this.14 First, because of the global nature of cyberspace, an event can
occur from a connected source anywhere in the world against a connected target
anywhere in the world. Second, even if the source of an event is determined, the owner of

13

“Malicious Programs.” Blog post. SecureList, N.D. Web.
Singer, P.W. and Alan Friedman. Cybersecurity and Cyberwar: What Everyone Needs to Know. New
York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2014. Print.
14
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a system or network is not necessarily aware that it was used for malicious activity. That
is, it is possible that the actual perpetrator had remote-access. Third, even if it is
determined that the perpetrator had remote-access, it is not necessarily possible to
identify the perpetrator.
Despite these difficulties, attribution to some degree is possible. 15 In fact, the
greater the scale of an operation, such as that characteristic of a state actor, the greater the
chance that crucial evidence is left behind (for example, logs from target systems and
networks or direct connections from source internet protocol (IP) addresses). Analysis of
this evidence, in addition to the tools, tactics, and procedures (TTPs) of the operation, can
be used to determine a source. Many aspects of the TTPs can be revealing. For example,
to maximize operational efficiency and reduce logistical cost, threat actors often reuse the
same infrastructure for operations, such as the same internet service providers or servers.
Because malware can be complex to develop, it is often modular, with threat actors
reusing the same or similar modules for multiple operations. As operations often adhere
to schedules and routines, the pattern of life of behind an operation provides evidence as
to the location and identity of the threat actor; for example, timing that coincides with
certain national holidays, local time zones, or institutional habits. Language preferences,
conventions, and errors in malware can reveal the native language of the threat actor, as
well as even background or experience. All this evidence, most importantly, can be used
to connect a series of operations.

15

Rid, Thomas and Ben Buchanan. “Attributing Cyber Attacks” Journal of Strategic Studies 38.1-2 (2015):
4-37. Web.
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Valeriano and Maness advocate, however, for going beyond simply using a
forensic model of attribution and propose that in the context of international relations,
attribution can be made to a high degree of confidence.16 This is especially applicable to
North Korea, which has obvious targets and goals. For example, even if there is little
forensic evidence directly implicating North Korea in a distributed denial of service
(DDOS) operation that targets South Korea and the United States on Independence Day
or in an offensive cyberspace operation that wipes the hard drives of media corporations
and financial institutions in South Korea days after North Korea promises retribution, the
most likely perpetrator is obvious. In fact, through offensive cyberspace operations, a
perpetrator is often able to simultaneously gain the benefits of signaling (and thus achieve
a political goal) while also avoiding the consequences of such operations by maintaining
plausible deniability. In addition, although there is the potential for these to be “false
flag” operations in which a perpetrator attempts to falsely implicate North Korea,
validation of this suspicion requires that there is a more compelling threat actor than
North Korea that also has the means, motive, and opportunity.

North Korean National Security Environment
North Korea remains arguably economically and diplomatically the most isolated
nation in the world. This isolation is in part self-imposed and due to the guiding national
ideology of Juche (self-reliance or self-determination), which advocates the protection of
the ruling regime and the idea that because North Korea is under constant threat, to

16

Valeriano, Brandon and Ryan Maness. Cyber War versus Cyber Realities: Cyber Conflict in the
International System. New York, NY: Oxford University Press, 2015. Print.
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survive it must remain economically and militarily reliant on no other nation.17 Its
isolation is also in part due to its development of nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles
in violation of or disregard for international treaties, agreements, and norms.18 This
development has brought about harsh economic and diplomatic sanctions from most
members of the international community. North Korea is also guided by the national
policy of Songun (military-first), which prioritizes the military in the conduct of state
affairs and the allocation of resources.
North Korea perceives external threats from the expanding gap in national power
between itself and South Korea and from an increasing distrust of the regional state actors
and former allies of China and Russia.19 There is also the immediate threat perceived in
the presence of South Korean and United States armed forces stationed on the peninsula,
as well as the potential threat perceived in the United States nuclear deterrent. North
Korea, in particular the ruling regime, perceives internal vulnerabilities in decreasing
economic control over the population20 and increasing flow of information other than
state-sanctioned media into and within the nation.21
North Korea’s overall national goals are to perpetually maintain the rule of the
current political regime and to eventually reunify the peninsula.22 To achieve these goals,

17

“Venerating the Kims: Just One More Religion?” The Economist, 7 April 2013. Web.
North Korea withdrew from the Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons in 2003, has never
joined the Comprehensive Nuclear-Test-Ban Treaty or Missile Technology Control Regime, and admitted
in 2003 that it had violated the Agreed Framework.
19
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Developments
Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015. 2015. Web.
20
Ibid.
21
Fang, Arnold. “North Korea’s Self-Imposed Isolation.” The Diplomat, 15 March 2016. Web.
22
Department of Defense, Office of the Secretary of Defense. Military and Security Developments
Involving the Democratic People’s Republic of Korea 2015. 2015. Web.
18

11

and in light of a military that is powerful in terms of quantity but not in terms of quality, 23
its capabilities and strategy have focused on asymmetrical and irregular warfare, in
particular through the use of special operations forces, as well as nuclear, biological, and
chemical weapons.

North Korean Conventional Capabilities and Strategy
North Korea’s national security apparatus is coordinated under the authority of
the Central Military Committee and the National Defense Commission, both of which are
chaired by the Supreme Leader, Kim Jong-un. The military is represented by the Ministry
of People’s Armed Forces, which exercises control over the Korean People’s Armed
Forces (KPAF). 24 The KPAF includes the Ground Force, Navy, Air Force, Strategic
Missile Force, and Special Operations Force. The KPAF is dominated by the Ground
Force, most of which is stationed near the demilitarized zone between North Korea and
South Korea. It maintains an active force strength of 1.2 million military personnel and a
reserve force strength of 7.6 million, with an additional 200,000 special operations
personnel.25 In comparison, allied forces consist of 655,000 South Korean and 23,500
United States military personnel.26

23

Laurence, Jeremy. “North Korea Military Has an Edge over South, but Wouldn't Win a War, Study
Finds.” The Christian Science Monitor, 4 January 2012. Web.
24
The KPAF is more traditionally referred to as the Korean People’s Army (KPA), with the main
constituent branches referred to as the KPA-Ground Force, KPA-Navy, and KPA-Air Force. The
alternative translation proposed here is more accurate and is used to avoid confusion.
25
McCafferty, Georgia. “Anniversary Parade Provides Rare Glimpse into North Korea's Military Might.”
CNN, 10 October 2015. Web.
26
Price, Greg. “U.S. Military Presence in Asia: Troops Stationed in Japan, South Korea, and Beyond.”
Newsweek, 26 April 2017. Web.
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Despite these numbers, North Korea’s military relies on personnel that are
undertrained and undernourished and on equipment that is obsolete.27 Most of the
military systems are overburdened and outdated, being produced in or based on designs
from China and the Soviet Union from the 1950s, 1960s, and 1970s. However, Kim Jongun has placed an emphasis on the development of modern systems.
According to the Center for Strategic and International Studies, North Korea has
focused its efforts on developing and expanding asymmetric warfare capabilities,
including weapons of mass destruction, ballistic missiles, and special operations and
cyberwarfare capabilities.28 As evidence for this, it has conducted five nuclear tests, with
the most recent in September 2016.29 It has continued and even intensified tests of
ballistic missiles, in particular the submarine-launched KN-11 and the mobile-launched
KN-15 (a variant of the KN-11), with the initial test for the KN-11 in December 2014 and
for the KN-15 in February 2017.30 Its special operations units are among the best-trained
and best-equipped in the military.
North Korea’s military strategy is derived from guidance provided by the Soviet
Union and experience gained during the guerrilla resistance against Japan. It is offensive
in nature and focused on the use of overwhelming surprise, speed, and force with
asymmetrical and irregular capabilities to counter the conventional strength of the armed

27

Blair, David. “North Korea v. South Korea: How the Countries' Armed Forces Compare.” The
Telegraph, 15 September 2015. Web.
28
Cordesman, Anthony. “Korean Peninsula Military Modernization Trends.” Washington, DC: Center for
Strategic and International Studies, 20 September 2016. Web.
29
“Missiles of North Korea.” Washington, DC: Center for Strategic and International Studies, N.D. Web.
30
Ibid.

13

forces of South Korea and the United States.31 This is embodied in the doctrine of “Fast
War, Fast End” and demonstrated in the structuring and stationing of the military.
Its military strategy is also characterized by belligerence and provocation, consisting of
rhetoric and confrontation that is sometimes violent yet below the threshold for an act of
war, which is used to gain concession from regional adversaries.32

31

Hodge, Home. “North Korea’s Military Strategy.” Parameters 33 (2013): 68-81. Web.
Sullivan, Tim. “North Korea and its Provocations: Belligerence as Strategy.” The Washington Times, 9
February 2016. Web.
32
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CHAPTER III: FRAMEWORKS AND METHODOLOGIES

There are four background topics that must be understood before answering the
research questions presented in this thesis: (1) how threat and vulnerability are
conceptualized in relation to risk, (2) how the cyber threat is assessed, (3) how
cyberspace and cyberspace operations are defined, and (4) how the target is analyzed.
Topic one is addressed through the Department of Homeland Security (DHS)
Risk Lexicon. Topic two is addressed through two sets of frameworks and
methodologies. The first, from the Sandia National Laboratories Operational Threat
Assessment (OTA), is used to analyze cyber threat actors and considers the factors of
commitment attributes and resource attributes. The second, from the Valeriano and
Maness DCIDD, is used to analyze cyber events and considers the factors of method,
severity, interaction, target, and goal. Topic three is addressed through two Department of
Defense (DOD) joint publications, 3-13 on information operations and 3-12 (R) on
cyberspace operations, as well as Army Field Manual 3-38 on cyber electromagnetic
activities. Topic four is addressed through a target-centric approach.

Conceptualizing Risk
The DHS conceptualizes risk as being comprised of a scenario, a threat, a
vulnerability, and a consequence as depicted in Figure 1.33 Within a scenario, a threat
exploits a vulnerability, which then has a consequence. The scenario includes a target, an
adversary, an attack method, and an attack path. The attack method refers to the tools and

33

Department of Homeland Security. DHS Risk Lexicon, September 2008. Web.
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tactics, and the attack path refers to the phases of planning, developing, and executing.
The threat is comprised of the capability and intent of the adversary. Because of this
inherent relationship, the term ‘threat’ often refers to the adversary as an actor itself and
not necessarily a combination of its capability and intent. To avoid confusion, the term
‘threat actor’ is used to maintain a distinction. The vulnerability is an attribute of an
entity that renders it vulnerable to exploitation and thus exposes an asset that has value to
the adversary. A consequence includes effects that are operational, psychological,
physical, and/or economic.

Risk

Scenario

Threat

Vulnerability

Consequence

Target

Capability

Operational

Adversary

Intent

Psychological

Attack method

Pysical

Attack path

Economic

Figure 1. Department of Homeland Security Elements of Risk.

To put these elements of risk in context, an unsecured system or network can be a
vulnerability, but only if there is an asset on that system or network worth protecting by
an owner or worth acquiring by an adversary. The adversary can be a threat to this
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unsecured network, but only if it has the means and motives (the capability and intent) to
exploit the vulnerability. It is this framework that is used to establish the fundamental
elements that must be considered in discussing the issue of North Korean in cyberspace.

Defining Cyberspace and Cyberspace Operations
Cyberspace and cyberspace operations are notoriously difficult to define due to
the nascent and dynamic nature of these concepts. Approaches to defining concepts can
be either normative or descriptive. DOD joint publications represent a more normative
approach. Joint Publication 3-13, the DOD guidance on information operations, states
that “cyberspace is a global domain within the information environment consisting of the
interdependent network of information technology infrastructures and resident data,
including the internet, telecommunications networks, computer systems, and embedded
processors and controllers”.34 Within this definition, there is an implication that
cyberspace has both a physical aspect (“the interdependent network of information
technology infrastructures”) and a virtual aspect (“[the] resident data”).
Joint Publication 3-12 (R), the DOD guidance on cyberspace operations,
categorizes cyberspace operations based on intent into offensive cyberspace operations
(OCO), defensive cyberspace operations (DCO), and DOD information network
(DODIN) operations.35 It defines OCO as “the application of force in or through
cyberspace” and DCO as “passive and active cyberspace defense operations to preserve
the ability to use [cyberspace] capabilities and protect data, networks, network-centric
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capabilities, and other designated systems”.36 Previous versions of the guidance referred
to OCO more narrowly as computer network attack (CNA) and DCO more narrowly as
computer network defense (CND), and included computer network exploitation (CNE).
CNE, which was considered an aspect of intelligence, is now referred to more broadly as
cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance (CISR) and is conceptualized
as supporting both OCO and DCO. In addition to intent, Joint Publication 3-12 (R) also
categorizes cyberspace operations based on capability as follows:
•

Cyberspace attack: Actions in cyberspace to deny access to or use of, as well
as manipulate the information, information systems, and/or information
networks of an adversary. Denial involves efforts to degrade (a function of
amount), disrupt (a function of time), and destroy (a function of both amount
and time). Manipulation involves efforts to control or alter.

•

Cyberspace defense: Actions in cyberspace to secure and defend the
information, information systems, and/or information networks of an owner
against an adversary. Activities include the actions of protecting, detecting,
characterizing, countering, and mitigating.

•

Cyberspace intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance: Actions in
cyberspace to collect intelligence that is required to support current and future
operations, including OCO and DCO.

Guidance from the Army, Field Manual 3-12, integrates the concept of
cyberspace operations with the concept of electronic warfare operations.37 It refers to this
as cyber electromagnetic activities. This can be understood as a shifting of focus from the
virtual aspect of cyberspace in Joint Publication 3-12 (R) to the physical aspect. Through
cyber electromagnetic activities, the Army can plan, integrate, and synchronize the
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missions of OCO, DCO, and DODIN with electronic attack, electronic protection,
electronic warfare support, and spectrum management operations.
Singer and Friedman represent a more descriptive approach to defining
cyberspace and cyberspace operations. Although the authors state that “cyberspace is the
realm of computer networks and [users] in which information is stored, shared, and
communicated online”, the focus is on describing the essential and unique features of
cyberspace.38 Cyberspace, as also defined in Joint Publication 3-13, is foremost an
information environment and is characterized by the creation, manipulation, transfer, and
storage of data. However, it is also the information systems, networks, and infrastructures
that allow these activities to occur. As such, to emphasize, the most important feature of
cyberspace is that it has both a physical aspect and a virtual aspect.
There are additional features of cyberspace that distinguish it from the traditional
domains of air, land, and sea. Cyberspace obscures conventional geopolitical boundaries,
it is artificial and therefore easily and quickly changes (at least relative to the other
domains), and activities within it can occur both in an instant and from a distance.
Regarding obscuring conventional geopolitical boundaries, it is a common misconception
that this means that cyberspace is a global commons, such as sea or space. However, as
emphasized earlier, cyberspace does have a physical aspect. This means that even if it is
global by virtue of being expansive and interconnected, elements of the infrastructure still
reside within sovereign territories that can exercise control over it. The tendency by those
in national security to forget the importance of this was even noted by Michael Hayden,
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the former Director of the NSA and former Director of the CIA, who stated that “DOD’s
construct of a separate domain tended to mute the traditional principles and
responsibilities of sovereignty.”39 Although this discussion of attributes is not exhaustive,
it does paint a picture of the nature of cyberspace adequate for this thesis.
Singer and Friedman use the availability, integrity, and confidentiality (AIC)
triad40 from the concept of information security to categorize cyberspace operations
according to the element of the triad that is threatened.41 Availability operations are those
that deny access to a system or network. These are equivalent to the denial activities of
DOD cyberspace attack. Integrity operations are those that penetrate systems or networks
to manipulate information. These are equivalent to the manipulation activities of DOD
cyberspace attack. Confidentiality operations are those that penetrate systems or networks
to monitor activities and exfiltrate information. This is equivalent to DOD cyberspace
intelligence, surveillance, and reconnaissance.
With all these operations, it is important to consider the consequence in the
context of national security. Although both are confidentiality operations, the theft of
credit card information from a retail business is much different than the theft of
background investigation information from a government organization or weapon system
designs from a defense contractor. An availability operation against a government
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website that denies access to services is also much different than an availability operation
against critical infrastructure that denies access to energy or water.
Because inconsistent or exaggerated use of key terms can lead to
misunderstanding or inflation of a situation, for the purposes of this thesis, these terms
are defined and maintained as follows:
•

Cyberspace: An information environment comprised of interconnected
systems and networks, including supporting infrastructure, and characterized
by the creation, manipulation, storage, and transfer of information and data.

•

Offensive cyberspace operations: Deliberate actions to disrupt or deny access
to information systems and networks by the adversary or to alter the integrity
of information and data on these systems and networks through modification
or deletion. This is popularly referred to as cyberattack.

•

Defense cyberspace operations: Deliberate actions to protect information
systems and networks and ensure the availability, integrity, and confidentiality
of the information and data on these systems and networks. This is popularly
referred to as cybersecurity.

•

Cyber exploitation/Cyber espionage:42 Deliberate actions to compromise the
confidentiality of information systems and networks used by the adversary
through the gaining of unauthorized access to monitor activity or exfiltrate
information and data.

In addition, ‘cyberspace activity’ will refer primarily to government and civilian actions
in cyberspace that are not associated with a specific national goal, and ‘cyberspace
operation’ will refer primarily to government actions that are associated with a specific
national goal. The actions of a cyberspace operation will be categorized as either
‘offensive cyberspace operations’, ‘defensive cyberspace operations’, or ‘cyber
exploitation/cyber espionage’ as appropriate. Other actions that are not associated with
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traditional political or military goals yet still represent malicious activity will be referred
to as cybercrime.

Characterizing the Cyber Threat
There are numerous methods for characterizing the cyber threat. These range from
taxonomies, which classify information about the threat, to frameworks and
methodologies, which provide a structure for understanding the threat and an approach to
assessing it.
Under the DHS Risk and Vulnerability Assessment program, which was
established to assist federal civilian government entities with assessing respective cyber
risks and vulnerabilities, Sandia National Laboratories developed the OTA
methodology.43 OTA was designed to assess cyber threats using consistent metrics and
models. A generic threat matrix, which is depicted in Table 1, is used in OTA to describe
cyber threat actors based on various attributes and then to categorize these along a
spectrum from most capable of achieving a goal (threat level 1) to least capable of
achieving a goal (threat level 8). That is, each level is an assessment of the threat actor
based on its capabilities. OTA was selected for this thesis because, in addition to
addressing capabilities in particular, it is intended to be used based on unclassified
information.
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Table 1. Operational Threat Assessment Generic Threat Matrix.
THREAT PROFILE
THREAT
LEVEL

Commitment Attributes

Resource Attributes

Intensity

Stealth

Time

Technical
Personnel

Cyber
Knowledge

Kinetic
Knowledge

Access

1

H

H

Years/Decades

Hundreds

H

H

H

2

H

H

Years/Decades

Tens/Tens

M

H

M

3

H

H

Months/Years

Tens/Tens

H

M

M

4

M

H

Weeks/Months

Tens

H

M

M

5

H

M

Weeks/Months

Tens

M

M

M

6

M

M

Weeks/Months

Ones

M

M

L

7

M

M

Months/Years

Tens

L

L

L

8

L

L

Days/Weeks

Ones

L

L

L

In the generic threat matrix, a threat profile is comprised of both commitment
attributes and resource attributes, which together represent the capability element of a
threat from the concept of risk. Although the measures for some attributes are
quantitative, such as time and technical personnel, others are necessarily qualitative, such
as intensity and stealth. These attributes and measures are defined as follows:
•

Intensity: The amount of determination and diligence that a threat actor has in
pursuit of its goals, as well the amount of associated risk that it is willing to
accept. (Low, Medium, or High)

•

Stealth: The ability of the threat actor to obscure or conceal the details about
itself, including its goals, operations, and structures. (Low, Medium, or High)

•

Time: The amount of time that a threat actor is willing to dedicate to planning,
developing, and executing operations in pursuit of its goals. (Days to Weeks,
Weeks to Months, Months to Years, or Years to Decades)
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•

Technical personnel: The number of personnel with specialized expertise that
the threat actor is able to use in its operations. (Ones, Tens, Tens of Tens, or
Hundreds)

•

Cyber knowledge: The amount of internal theoretical and practical expertise
related to the cyber domain that a threat actor has and its ability to use this
expertise in pursuit of its goals. Expertise includes the ability of the threat to
share information internally, acquire additional expertise, and conduct
research and development. (Low, Medium, or High)

•

Kinetic knowledge: The amount of internal theoretical and practical expertise
related to the kinetic domain that a threat actor has and its ability to use this
expertise in pursuit of its goals. Expertise includes the ability of the threat to
share information internally, acquire additional expertise, and conduct
research and development. (Low, Medium, or High)

•

Access: The ability of the threat actor to penetrate a secured system or
network through either cyber or kinetic means. (Low, Medium, or High)

It is important to emphasize that the generic threat matrix is intended to simply provide a
best possible match. It is likely that a threat actor will not have an exact fit to a level, but
rather will share more attributes with a certain level over another.
In addition to this, Valeriano and Maness provide a framework and methodology
for assessing cyberspace incidents in the context of international relations.44 As such, the
focus is on interactions between state actors in cyberspace, although non-state entities as
targets are considered. This framework and methodology was used to compile the
DCIDD. The factors identified are the method, severity, interaction, target, and goal.
From the framework of risk, roughly, the method corresponds to attack method and
attack path, the severity corresponds to consequence, the target corresponds to target, and
the goal corresponds to intent. The types for each of these factors is depicted in Figure 2.
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It is important to note that for the authors the term ‘cyber incident’ refers to an individual
operation and the term ‘cyber dispute’ refers to a series of operations. For the factor of
interaction, types 4 through 6 are applicable only to cyber dispute and for the factor of
target, types 4 through 7.

FACTOR

Method

Severity

Interaction

Target

Goal

TYPES
1. Vandalism
2. Denial of service
3. Intrusion
4. Infiltration
4.1 Logic bomb (any type)
4.2 Virus
4.3 Worm
4.4 Packet sniffer (any type)
4.5 Keystroke logger (any type)
5. Advanced persistent threat
6. Vandalism and denial of service
7. Intrusion and infiltration
1. Minimal effect
2. Effect on critical national infrastructure or military
3. Dramatic effect on national security strategy
4. Dramatic effect on nation
5. Catastrophic effect on nation
1. Nuisance
2. Defensive
3. Offensive
4. Nuisance and defensive
5. Nuisance and offensive
6. Nuisance, defense, and offensive
1. Private
2. Government non-military
3. Government military
4. Private and government non-military
5. Private and government military
6. Government (non-military and military)
7. Private and government (non-military and military)
1. Disruption of target activity
2. Acquisition of target information and data
3. Modification of target behavior

Figure 2. Factors and Types for Dyadic Cyber Incident and Dispute Dataset.
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It is also important to discuss the factor of method, the types for which are
described in Table 2 with slight modifications to phrasing. Vandalism includes activities
such as website defacements, and common tools include the insertion of malicious code.
Denial of service includes activities such as DDOS attacks, and common tools include
botnets. Intrusion includes activities such as compromising systems to allow
unauthorized access, and common tools include trojans or backdoors. Infiltration includes
activities such as forcing systems to conduct unauthorized activity, and common tools
include logic bombs, viruses, worms, packet sniffers, and keystroke loggers. According
to the authors, intrusions and infiltrations are distinguished from each other in that
intrusions are more exploitative and general, and infiltrations are more disruptive and
precise. Although the authors also claim that only infiltrations are the methods that states
can claim as an act of war, the DOD document that the authors cited did not state this
explicitly.45 From these descriptions, the method used for in operation is understood to be
a combination of tools and tactics.
However, because the tools of cyberspace operations (malware or malicious code)
represent overlapping tactics, the types as proposed encounter difficulties. The
descriptions from Valeriano and Maness for the tools and tactics of the method used in an
operation are also different from the classifications for the types and functions of
malware presented earlier. For example, the authors categorize malware as infiltration,
even though malware can have functions unrelated to infiltration. Although trojans can
function as backdoors, backdoors are described as being different in not needing an
operator to be installed and executed.
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Table 2. Valeriano and Maness Methods of Cyberspace Operations.
CODE/EVENT

EXAMPLE

EXPLANATION

1. Vandalism

Website defacements

SQL injection or cross-scripting

2. DOS

DDOS attacks

3. Intrusion

Trapdoors or trojans, backdoors

4. Infiltration

Logic bombs, worms, viruses, packet
sniffers, keystroke loggers

5. APT

Advanced persistent threats

6. Vandalism and
DOS
7. Intrusion and
Infiltration

Cyber disputes
Cyber disputes

Botnets used to shut down websites with
high traffic
Software injected remotely for intrusions
and thefts
Different methods that are used to
penetrate target networks; software can be
installed remotely or physically
Precise and sophisticated methods that
have specific targets; methods can include
vandalism, DOS, intrusion or APT
Combined incidents of vandalism and
DOS
Combined incidents of intrusion and
infiltration

This is the difference between a trojan and a worm or virus, and remote-access is not a
function exclusive to any of these types. Infiltration is said to include worms, viruses,
packet sniffers, keystroke loggers, and logic bombs, even though worms and viruses can
have functions unrelated to infiltration, and trojans can also function as packet sniffers or
keystroke loggers. Although logic bombs are described as modifying or deleting data, the
reason for categorizing these under intrusion instead of vandalism or denial of service is
not clarified. In addition, although the authors note that the types for the methods used in
cyberspace operations do not indicate a scale of severity, which is addressed in the
severity of the operation, there does seem to be some overlap with the goal of an
operation.
However, despite these discrepancies, this methodology is the most practical for
assessing the capability and intent (among other aspects) of interactions in cyberspace. In
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addition to the threat level from OTA that corresponds to capability, all the elements
required for a comprehensive assessment are now present.

Analyzing the Target
For the purposes of this thesis, it is helpful to approach the topic as a target of
intelligence analysis. Clark advocates a target-centric approach and presents the target as
both a system and a network (in the abstract sense not the technological sense). A system
is comprised of three elements: (1) the structure or relationships between the entities
within the system, (2) the function or the results or effects produced by the system, and
(3) the processes or the activities within the system that produce the results or effects. On
the topic of North Korean cyberspace operations, the organizations that conduct the
operations are a system. There are managers, engineers, operators, and other entities in
hierarchical, lateral, and other relationships that plan, develop, and execute cyberspace
operations to achieve national goals.
A network is comprised of nodes and links. There are networks within systems, as
suggested by the presence of entities (nodes) and relationships (links). However, there are
also networks of systems. North Korean cyberspace operations do not occur in isolation.
The organizations that conduct the activities are nodes linked to other supporting or
opposing organizations both inside and outside of North Korea. For example, in addition
to cyber organizations, the KPAF Air Force and KPAF Navy also support national goals
but in traditional domains, and Chinese internet service providers facilitate North Korean
cyberspace operations. The United States, as well as its allies and partners, however,
attempt to hinder North Korean cyberspace activities both offensively and defensively.
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CHAPTER IV: ANALYSIS OF CYBER POWER

Although there is no single definition that is agreed upon, state power can be
understood generally as the capacity to conduct certain activities by the state and
specifically as the ability to use these activities to produce desirable results for the state.46
This implies the existence of resources (that provide the capacity) and strategy (that
guides the ability). It is the resources and strategy of a state that establish the context for
understanding the threats it poses and the vulnerabilities it possesses. Cyberpower in
particular is the capacity and ability to affect desirable outcomes on or in cyberspace.
According to Nye, cyberpower is based on resources that relate to the creation, control,
and communication of information in cyberspace, such as infrastructure and personnel.47
The author also recognizes, however, that strategy includes instruments of cyberpower
that are both physical and virtual, reflecting the nature of cyberspace itself. For example,
a state can destroy systems and networks in the physical world or it can deny access to or
manipulate the integrity of information in the virtual world. The following sections will
discuss the cyber resources and strategy of North Korea, as well as the assessments of its
cyberpower in comparison to other nations.
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Civilian Cyber Resources and Activities
Although the civilian cyber infrastructure of North Korea lags far behind that of
other nations, its development has been cautious yet consistent. Its initial internet
connection was established by the Korea Computer Center (KCC) in 2003 via satellite
with a German company called KCC Europe, which then for several years operated the
‘.kp’ domain name and hosted North Korean websites.48 In 2010, after the websites
disappeared from the internet, the KCC inquired for several months about reinstating
service with no response from KCC Europe. It then terminated its service agreement and
transferred its service to a company called Star Joint Venture, a joint venture between
North Korea’s Post and Telecommunications Corporation and Thailand’s Loxley Pacific,
which offered internet connection via landline with the Chinese state-owned enterprise
China Unicom. Star Joint Venture started hosting North Korean websites on the internet
in October 2010. However, the websites were accessible only by using the direct IP
addresses until Star Joint Venture acquired official control of the ‘.kp’ domain name in
January of 2011. Star Joint Venture remains the single internet service provider for North
Korea. It is estimated that there are only a few thousand internet users restricted to elites
and to foreigners, with access available only after obtaining an IP address from the
Ministry of Post and Telecommunications and computers required to be registered with
local authorities.49 For even these users, the government monitors activities and restricts
access to certain websites, such as Facebook, Twitter, and YouTube.50 It has also
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requested that foreign embassies in North Korea that have Wi-Fi require passwords or
decrease signal strength to prevent unauthorized access by locals.51
In addition to the internet, there is a domestic intranet called Kwangmyong (Bright
Star) that was established in 2000 and is free to access by the population. Although a
misconfiguration in a domain name server exposed 28 websites under the ‘.kp’ domain
name to the internet in September 2016, it is estimated that there are from 1,000 to 5,000
websites accessible only through Kwangmyong, which is operated under a different
domain name system.52 Kwangmyong includes search and email functionality and offers a
variety of content, including news and entertainment media and shopping. Actual usage
statistics, unsurprisingly, are not available.
All computers, including those used to access both the internet and Kwangmyong,
are installed with domestic software that is often based on open-source software. For
example, the official operating system, Pulgunbyol (Red Star), is based off Linux and the
official web browser, Naenara (My Country), is based off Firefox. Red Star was
developed by the KCC in 1998, with the most recent version released in 2013.53 Other
software that has been developed by the government includes a firewall called Nungna,
an antivirus program called Kullaksae, and an access control solution called Pogom.54
According to German researchers, a unique feature of Red Star is that it tags each media
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file with a unique identifier for the computer once it is accessed.55 It also prevents users
from modifying basic functions of the core operating system or disabling the firewall or
antivirus program.56
Analysis of a recent tablet produce around 2015 or 2016 by North Korea reveals
an increasing sophistication in the degree of surveillance and control incorporated into
devices.57 A program called Red Flag runs as a background process, capturing a
screenshot every time the user opens an application, recording the browser history and
unique identifier for the tablet, and ensuring that the core operating system is not
modified. A tagging feature for media similar to similar to Red Star is also present. In
addition, the installation of applications is limited to an approved whitelist. Even more
restrictive than this, the tablet is able to access media only if it has the digital certificate
either NATISIGN (authorized by the North Korean government) or SELFSIGN (created
on the tablet itself). This prevents the sharing of unauthorized media between users.
Much of North Korea’s information technology (IT) research and development is
done at the state-owned KCC, which was established in 1990. Despite claims of being for
research and development, it was reported in 2001 that the KCC had actually been
established under the initiative of Kim Jong-nam, the eldest son of Kim Jong-il, for
foreign intelligence.58 Information from the National Intelligence Service (NIS) from
2005 confirmed that Kim Jong-nam, who at the time was involved with security and
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counterintelligence operations at the Ministry of State Security, used the KCC to control
communications into and out of North Korea and to monitor and collect foreign
intelligence.59 There are/were around 1,000 personnel at the KCC, although it has
recently been reported that most have been sent abroad to earn money for the regime.60
Despite possible ulterior functions and in addition to research and development, the KCC
is also responsible for the management of computer networks and websites within the
nation, education and training, and hardware and software distribution, with offices in
China, Japan, and Europe. There are nine centers subordinate to the KCC:61
1.
2.
3.
4.
5.
6.
7.
8.
9.

Red Star Information Center (internet applications and multimedia)
Samilpo Information Center (applications)
Osandok Information Center (systems software and operating systems)
Mankyong Information Center (information and communications software)
Chongbong Information Center (artificial intelligence)
Sobaeksu Information Center (control automation and quality engineering)
Miryong Information Center (medical applications)
Samjiyon Information Center (multimedia systems)
Naenara Information Center (digital content production and services)

Other state-owned IT ventures, each with hundreds of personnel, include the
Pyongyang Informatics Center, Daeyang IT Company, and Hi-Tech Development
Company, as well as IT firms subordinate to commercial enterprises such as the Unha
Corporation or Korea Roksan General Trading Company.62 Another venture, the
Kwangmyong IT Center, specializes in network security, data encryption and recovery,
and biometric identification and seems to be a spinoff of the Oun Information Center,
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which had been subordinate to the KCC and specialized in information security. North
Korea has even pursued joint ventures with foreign entities; for example, the Nosotek
(between the North Korean General Federation of Science and Technology and
entrepreneurs from Germany) and Hana Electronics (between the North Korean Ministry
of Culture and investors from the United Kingdom).63
Initial service for North Korea’s mobile network was established in November
2002 under Loxley Pacific, the same company that later formed Star Joint Venture.64
Before this, mobile communications had been limited to senior military and party
officials. The 2G network provided service to around 20,000 subscribers until all mobile
phone use was banned in 2004 following an alleged assassination against Kim Jong-il
that used a remote-detonated explosive device. Service resumed in December 2008 under
a company called Koryolink, a joint venture between North Korea’s Post and
Telecommunications Corporation and Egypt’s Orascom Telecom Media and
Technology.65 Although initially limited to voice service and short messaging service
(SMS) and around 6,000 subscribers, the 3G network currently supports multimedia
messaging service (MMS) and around 3 million subscribers, with the capacity to support
up to 6 million.
The network is divided into two tiers, with local subscribers able to connect only
to domestic numbers (tier one) and foreign subscribers able to connect only to
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international numbers (tier two).66 Subscribers can contact numbers within the same tier
but not those outside of it. As of February 2013, foreign subscribers have also been able
to connect to the internet. In 2014, Koryolink provided access to a limited number of
websites on Kwangmyong.67 In addition to the regular mobile network, there is a separate
network that is reserved for the elites and that uses unique hardware and software to
secure communications. This separate network (isolated from both local and foreign
subscribers) was required because export restrictions prevented the incorporation of
modern encryption technology.
For locals wanting to communicate with the outside world (for example,
smugglers or those with defector family members in China or South Korea), Chinese
mobile networks can be accessed along some of the border areas between North Korea
and China.68 It has been reported, however, that the North Korean government has been
jamming mobile signals to prevent this.69
In addition to the conventional networks, such as the internet, Kwangmyong, and
mobile, there is a human network of illicit storage mediums that are smuggled into and
out of North Korea. These storage mediums include CDs/DVDs, USB flash drives, and
SD cards that are carried in person, dropped by balloon, or transported via drone. The
content is usually news and entertainment media from South Korea that offers a rare
glimpse of the outside world. Because personal computers are expensive and difficult to
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acquire for many in North Korea, the content is accessed using a smartphone with a USB
port or a device called a notel, a portable CD/DVD player that also includes a USB port
and SD slot, as well as television and radio tuners. These low-cost and low-power
devices, which are manufactured in China, were initially smuggled in and distributed
illegally.70 However, demand and usage became so pervasive that the North Korean
government capitulated and legalized the devices in 2015, although it did require all to be
purchased at state-owned stores and registered with local government authorities.
Television and radio tuners on the devices were also fixed to government stations.

Military Cyber Resources and Operations
North Korea has made consistent and dramatic efforts to enhance its military
cyber infrastructure. In 2014, it completed the installation of a dedicated high-speed
fiber-optic military intranet referred to as Kumpyol (Gold Star) that allows for integrated
command and control between strategic, operational, and tactical units.71 According to
the most recent white paper from the Ministry of National Defense, North Korea has also
doubled its cyberwarfare personnel over four years from an estimated 3,000 in 2012 to
6,800 in 201672 and has conducted operations against South Korea to disrupt civilian and
military activities and to target critical infrastructure.73 It is alleged that 1,100 of these
personnel conduct covert cyberspace operations from locations abroad, which offer
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increased internet capacity and increased operational anonymity.74 The personnel operate
under the cover of legitimate North Korean IT firms abroad or joint ventures in China
and Southeast Asia.
The Reconnaissance General Bureau (RGB) of the KPAF is responsible for
intelligence and covert operations. It is comprised of six bureaus with compartmentalized
functions, including operations, reconnaissance, cyber and technology, intelligence
abroad, inter-Korean issues, and service support.75 Around 2009 and 2010, units
associated with cyberspace operations that were scattered among the Korean Worker’s
Party and the Ministry of People’s Armed Forces were consolidated under the RGB.
North Korea has one confirmed and two suspected cyber units that are subordinate
administratively to the RGB but that report directly to the National Defense
Commission.76 These units are outlined in Figure 3.77
Bureau 121, the bureau for cyber and technology, is the most important and most
infamous unit. It is responsible for both offensive and defensive cyberspace operations,
including CNA, CND, and CNE, and has been implicated in multiple high-profile
cyberspace operations against South Korea and the United States.78
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Reconnaissance
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Figure 3. Cyber Units under the Reconnaissance General Bureau. Units in grey are
unconfirmed or suspected of having been merged or disbanded.

Its alternative designation, the Cyber Warfare Guidance Bureau under the Electronic
Reconnaissance Bureau, denotes that it is possibly overseen personally by Kim Jong-un,
which is an indication of its strategic significance.79 According to a defector who studied
with eventual operators for Bureau 121 at Kim Il Military University, 80 the unit is
comprised of around 1,800 personnel and has teams inside and outside of North Korea.81
Mention of Unit 180 emerged in 2017 following a series of ransomware
operations around the world. According to a defector, a former professor at Kim Il
Military University, Unit 180 is responsible for cyberspace operations aimed at acquiring
money for the regime, oftentimes by breaching the computers and networks of financial
institutions and transferring money out of accounts.82 Although its position within the
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structure of the RGB was not specified, the designation and mission most likely places it
subordinate to Bureau 121.
Other suspected units under the RGB include the Computer Technology Research
Lab and Lab 110. Although little information is available, it is possible that these units
are responsible for the development of exploitation tools and techniques. It is also
possible that Computer Technology Research Lab and Lab 110 have been merged with
other units or disbanded.83
In addition to the RGB, there are two cyber units subordinate to the GSD of the
KPA. These units are outlined in Figure 4.84 Although, again, little information is
available, it is possible that the Operations Bureau is responsible for joint cyber mission
coordination and integration, as well as the planning and disseminating of cyber strategy.
According to a report from the Korean Institute for National Unification, the Command
Automation Bureau conducts computer network operations (CNO) and is responsible for
developing malware and searching for exploits.85 It has from 50 to 60 personnel and
includes Unit 31 (malware development), Unit 32 (military software development), and
Unit 56 (command and control software development).
Although the Enemy Collapse and Sabotage Bureau conducts operations in
cyberspace, its mission is characterized as being more information warfare than
cyberwarfare (CNA or CNE). It was also reported in 2016 that pursuant to a recent
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restructuring, the GSD has added a Command Information Bureau and implemented an
integrated tactical command and control system to enhance its command, control,
communication, computer, and intelligence capabilities.86

General Staff
Department

Operations
Bureau

Command
Automation
Bureau

Enemy Collapse
and Sabotage
Bureau

Communications
Bureau

Electronic
Warfare Bureau

Unit 31

Unit 32

Unit 56

Figure 4. Cyber Units under the General Staff Department. Units in grey are assumed to
have missions outside the scope of cyberwarfare.

Cyber Strategy
Kim Jong-un once stated that “cyberwarfare is all-purpose sword that can
guarantee ruthless strikes of the [Korea People’s Armed Forces] along with nuclear
weapons and missiles.”87 North Korea’s cyberspace strategy reflects its overall offensive
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posture and emphasis on asymmetrical and irregular warfare, with cyberspace operations
considered “a low-cost, low-risk” means of targeting the vulnerabilities of other states
that rely on cyberspace for civilian and military activities.88 Cyberspace operations offer
North Korea the potential to damage or destroy the command, control, and
communication networks of South Korea and the United States, neutralizing the benefits
that these networks offer without the costs and risks associated with physical operations.
North Korea also uses cyberspace to exploit the benefits of the treasure trove of open
source scientific and technical intelligence that can be used to support domestic research
and development efforts without the risk of defection or influence inherent with sending
researchers abroad.89
Although the figures are varied, it is estimated that North Korea has spent
between $1.1 billion and $3.2 billion overall on nuclear weapons development.90 This
amount is far greater than the cost of training and equipping even 6,800 personnel to
conduct cyberspace operations. There are also the high risks of escalation and loss
inherent to physical operations. For example, on 23 November 2010, North Korea fired
over a hundred artillery shells and rockets at Yeonpyeong Island in South Korea in
response to a South Korean naval exercise. South Korea retaliated by shelling North
Korean artillery positions. By the end of the conflict, there were 25 South Korean civilian
and military casualties and at least 5 North Korean military casualties.
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Its cyberspace strategy also represents a means of financial income. North Korea
has for decades engaged in illicit activities to finance the regime and to overcome
economic sanctions. These activities have included the smuggling of goods, the
manufacturing of drugs, and the counterfeiting of goods and currency.91 Often done under
the guise of legitimate companies and the protection of diplomatic immunity, countries
such as China, Malaysia, and Singapore have been referenced as nodes in the networks of
illicit activities by North Korea.92 Increasing the enforcement of sanctions in these
countries also increases the possibility that North Korea will turn to cybercrime to
support itself. North Korea has in fact been implicated in the high-profile cybertheft of
$81 million from the Bangladesh Bank in February 2016 and cyberextortion of around
$55,000 through the ransomware operation WannaCry in May 2017.93

Assessment of Cyberpower
Clark approaches cyberpower from a military perspective and defines it as the
ability to conduct successful cyberwarfare. 94 Although the author identifies three factors
that comprise cyberpower (cyber offense, cyber defense, and cyber dependence), the
method for assigning the values is never made explicit. The assessment, which is
depicted in Table 3, reveals that North Korea ranks as the highest for cyberpower (despite
its low offensive ability) due to its high defensive ability and low dependence.
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Table 3. Cyberpower and Ranking According to Clark. Nations are listed from highest to
lowest.
NATION

OFFENSE

DEFENSE

DEPENDENCE

TOTAL

North Korea

2

9

7

18

Russia

7

5

4

16

China

5

4

6

15

United States

8

2

1

11

Valeriano and Maness maintain the same approach as Clark but assign different
values as depicted in Table 4. 95 In this alternate assessment, there is a notable difference
in the value assigned to defensive ability for North Korea, with North Korea also ranking
lowest for cyberpower. Although, again, the method for assigning values is not made
explicit, these assessments do reveal the complicated nature of cyberspace and some of
the factors that are relevant in evaluating cyberpower.

Table 4. Cyberpower and Ranking According to Valeriano and Maness. Nations are listed
from highest to lowest.
NATION

OFFENSE

DEFENSE

DEPENDENCE

TOTAL

Russia

7

8

3

18

China

8

5

4

17

United States

10

5

2

17

North Korea

3

2

9

14
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The Australian Strategic Policy Institute approaches cyberpower from a
development perspective, which it refers to as cyber maturity.96 It defines cyber maturity
as the presence and operation of effective physical and institutional cyber infrastructure
and identifies five categories.
1. Governance: Ability and intent to address cyber issues through legislation and
regulation domestically and to engage internationally. Includes the factors of
(1a) organizational structure, (1b) legislation/regulation, and (1c) international
engagement.
2. Financial cybercrime enforcement: Capacity to address financial cybercrime.
Includes the factor of (2) financial cybercrime.
3. Military application: Capability and intent regarding the military use of
cyberspace. Includes the factor of (3) military application.
4. Digital economy and business: Understanding of the importance of
cyberspace on economy and business. Includes the factors of (4a) engagement
between government and business and (4b) digital economy.
5. Social engagement: Public awareness of and engagement on cyber issues.
Includes the factors of (5a) public awareness, (5b) fixed broadband
penetration, and (5c) mobile broadband penetration.
The cyber maturity rankings for China, North Korea, South Korea, and the United States
are depicted in Table 5.

Table 5. Cyberpower and Ranking According to Australian Strategic Policy Institute.
RANK

NATION

SCORE

1

United States

88.1

2

South Korea

83.6

8

China

63

22

North Korea

16.7

96
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Trusting these assessments, although North Korea does not have the same
offensive cyber ability as the more powerful nations of the United States, Russia, and
China and lags far behind in cyber development, it does have a considerable defensive
cyber ability and negligible cyber dependence. This is due to its aforementioned isolation
and almost absolute control over all forms of information technologies and
communications (including computers, mobile phones, the internet, and all other
networks). North Korea is able to easily and effectively sever its connection to
cyberspace if threatened, and the operation of its infrastructure has little reliance on
cyberspace.
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CHAPTER V: ANALYSIS OF CYBERSPACE CAPABILITIES AND INTENT

In the DCIDD, from 2008 to 2011, Valeriano and Maness identified three North
Korean cyberspace operations against the United States, ten against South Korea, and one
against Japan. Of these, information on eight operations could not be found at the source
cited or in any other source. These operations have therefore been excluded from the
analysis. The authors also identified one South Korean cyberspace operation against
North Korea in 2011. However, again, information was unable to be found, and this
operation has been excluded. The resulting timelines cover all other cyberspace
operations both by North Korea and against North Korea from July 2009 to February
2017.
There are a few notes regarding the timelines:
•

Dates provided indicate the month and year that an operation occurred or a
series of operations ended for offensive cyberspace operations and the month
and year that either was discovered for cyber exploitation or cyber espionage.

•

Events listed are those for which there was an analysis or investigation by
credible authorities, such as government organizations or network security
companies.

•

Technical details are omitted unless pertinent.

•

It is expected that sensitive information that possibly reveals sources and
methods has been withheld by intelligence organizations.

•

In addition to the assessments unique to this thesis, operations from July 2009
to April 2011 include the assessments from the DCIDD for reference only.
Because the discrepancies are minor, any discussion is considered beyond the
scope the thesis.

•

An ‘X’ in a table indicates that there is not enough information to assign a
value for that factor.
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According to Valeriano and Maness, there is a tendency in the international
system for ‘cyber hype’ (otherwise a form of ‘threat inflation’).97 Media headlines and
articles often refer to CNA and CNE operations as a generalized “cyberattack” or “hack,”
regardless of nuances in the technical sophistication of the threat actor, the target
vulnerabilities, operational goals, and the degree to which any of this can be confirmed.98
Many events or series of events are characterized as a sophisticated threat actor executing
a successful “cyberattack” or “hack” against a vulnerable or fragile target. The danger of
this is not only that perceptions of the threat and interactions in the international system
will be misguided, but also that nations will waste human, financial, and technical
resources in addressing the wrong threat and therefore remain vulnerable.
The threat from North Korea’s cyberspace operations has already been analyzed
in regard to its resources and strategy. This can be thought of as its potential threat. The
requirement now is a detailed analysis of the actual threat that cuts through the threat
inflation. That is, how North Korea’s cyberspace resources and strategy are realized for
use in operations and what effect this has on its targets. As noted by the Korea Economic
Institute of America:99
In cyberspace, many of the North Korean capabilities and intentions may be
revealed only after a real attack takes place in the virtual domain,
for which they will either claim responsibility or which will be undeniably traced
back to the North Korean government or the non-state actors commissioned or
controlled by [North Korea].
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Cyberspace Operations by North Korea
July 2009. A series of DDOS operations on July 4, July 7, and July 9 disrupted
access to the websites of 27 financial institutions, government organizations, and media
corporations in South Korea and the United States.100 According to Symantec, the
computers used in the operations were infected with a piece of malware referred to as
TROJAN.DOZER and propagated through email using varies worms.101 On July 10, a
time bomb contained in the malware destroyed data in the MBR and partition table of the
infected computers and overwrote the hard drive with the string “Memory of
Independence Day”. Network security experts noted that the malware was relatively
unsophisticated and that the operations were unable to generate enough requests for data
to cause more than minor disruptions.102 The NIS reported that the operations were likely
planned and executed by a specific group or state and an unconfirmed statement
implicated North Korea.103
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
a worm (4.3), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or military (2), was an
individual cyber event that was offensive (3), targeted government military entities (3),
and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). The operation against the United States
used the method of denial of service (2), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual
cyber event that was a nuisance (1), targeted government non-military entities (2), and
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had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of
the section, with the data from the DCIDD recreated in Table 7 for comparison.

January 2011. A DDOS operation in January 2011 disrupted access to the
website of an internet forum in South Korea.104 The users of this internet forum had
claimed responsibility for gaining access to the official Twitter and YouTube accounts of
the North Korean government and posting derogatory comments and propaganda videos.
This was done on January 8 to coincide with the Kim Jong-un’s birthday. It was
suspected that the DDOS operation was retaliation by North Korea.
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
a denial of service (2), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was a
nuisance (1), targeted a private entity (1), and had the goal of disrupting target activity
(1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section, with the data from the
DCIDD recreated in Table 7 for comparison.

March 2011. A DDOS operation on March 4 disrupted access to the websites of
40 financial institutions and government organizations in South Korea, as well to the
websites of Kunsan Air Base and United States Forces Korea.105 According to Symantec,
the computers used in the operation were infected with a piece of malware referred to as
TROJAN.KOREDOS that was used for the DDOS operation and to destroy data in the
master boot record, as well as a piece of malware referred to as BACKDOOR.PRIOXER
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that was used to gain remote-access.106 BACKDOOR.PRIOXER was considered
relatively sophisticated due to its discrete method of infection. However, it was uncertain
if this was intentional. A report from McAfee noted that the sophistication for the
encryption of the malware and command and control of the operation was excessive in
comparison to the limited execution and effect of the attack, which was designed to last
no more than ten days. 107 It was suspected that the operation was intended to test and
observe the time required for the operation to be discovered, analyzed, and mitigated.
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
a denial of service (2), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or military (2), was
an individual cyber event that was a nuisance (1), targeted government non-military
entities (2), and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). The operation against the
United States used the method of denial of service (2), had a minimal effect (1), was an
individual cyber event that was a nuisance (1), targeted government military entities (3),
and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end
of the section, with the data from the DCIDD recreated in Table 7 for comparison.

April 2011. An offensive cyberspace operation on April 12 destroyed system data
and disrupted access to the internal network at Nonghyup Bank in South Korea, lasting
three days and affecting 30 million customers.108 According to the results of an
investigation by the Seoul Central District Prosecutor’s Office, backdoor malware was
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introduced to the network in September 2010 via the infected laptop of a network security
contractor, which was among 201 computers that had been infected during an
undisclosed offensive cyberspace operation against financial institutions and government
organizations in July 2009. The malware allowed the perpetrator to exfiltrate information
(including internet protocols and system passwords) and install malicious code
throughout the network over a period of several months. After the malicious code was
installed, a remote deletion command was executed, destroying data on 273 of 587
servers. The perpetrator then confirmed the success of the operation and destroyed
evidence from both the laptop and the network. Due to the sophistication of the attack, it
was suspected that considerable human, financial, and technical resources were required.
The operation used malware that was similar to the July 2009 attack, as well as an IP
address that was used for a command and control server from the same operation. Normal
operations did not resume for a few weeks.109
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
a virus (4.2), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was a nuisance
(1), targeted private entities (1), and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). This is
summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section, with the data from the DCIDD recreated
in Table 7 for comparison.

March 2013 (DarkSeoul/Operation Troy). An offensive cyberspace operation
on March 20 destroyed data at three media corporations (MBC, KBS, and YTN) and
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three financial institutions (Jeju Bank, Nonghyup Bank, Shinhan Bank) in South
Korea.110 The operation used a piece of malware referred to as TROJAN.JOKRA that
was used to gain remote-access and delete the MBR and content of any system or
network hard drive.111 The initial infection occurred through a spearphishing email weeks
before the operation and was further propagated via email and patch management.112 The
operation occurred days after North Korea promised retribution for an alleged offensive
cyberspace operation against it by the United States and South Korea. Normal operations
resumed within a few hours. This operation has sometimes been referred to as DarkSeoul.
According to a report from McAfee, this operation was not an isolated event, but
rather the culmination of a cyber espionage operation referred to as Operation Troy.113
Operation Troy represented an APT that had specific targets only in South Korea. The
various operations, which included at least those from July 2009, March 2011, and April
2011, were likely intended to collect intelligence regarding the targets to prepare for
future offensive cyberspace operations, such as the March 20 operation. Evidence for the
suspected connection included similarities in the targets, as well as the TTPs of the
operations. Operation Troy and subsequent operations suspected of being related to it
have been attributed to a group later referred to as the DarkSeoul Gang, named after the
malware and operation that brought it to light.
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Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
a worm (4.3) and was also an APT (5), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or
military (2), was a series of cyber events that were a nuisance and offensive (5), targeted
private entities (1), and had the goal of acquiring target information and data (2). This is
summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section.

June 2013. A series of DDOS operations on June 25 (the anniversary of the start
of the Korean War) disrupted access to the websites of government organizations in
North Korea and South Korea. 114 The homepage of the Blue House in South Korea was
also defaced with a message praising Kim Jong-un as the leader of a unified Korea. It
was uncertain if both countries had attacked each other or if another actor had executed
the attacks. However, a blog post by Symantec, attributed at least the operation on South
Korea to the DarkSeoul Gang, noting several similarities in the targets and TTPs of this
operation with those from July 2009, March 2011, and March 2013 as evidence:115 Eric
Chien, a technical director with Symantec, suspected that the group behind the operation
was comprised of between 10 and 50 members.116
•

Use of multistaged and coordinated operations against high-profile targets in
South Korea

•

Use of destructive payloads, such as malicious code for hard drive wipes and
DDOS operations, configured to trigger on significant dates

•

Overwriting hard drive sectors with strings that have political themes
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•

Use of patching mechanisms from legitimate third-parties to propagate across
internal networks

•

Use of specific encryption and obfuscation methods

•

Use of webmail servers from specific third-parties to store files

•

Use of similar command and control structures

An official from the Ministry of Science, ICT, and Future Planning also noted that an
analysis of the malicious code and affected systems revealed evidence of an IP address
from North Korea, as well as similarities in the TTPs.
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
denial of service (2), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was a
nuisance (1), targeted government non-military entities (2), and had the goal of disrupting
target activity (1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section.

September 2013 (Operation Kimsuky). Kaspersky Lab reported on 11
September that it had uncovered a cyber espionage operation from at least April to
monitor activity and exfiltration information from eleven entities in South Korea,
including government organizations, private research institutes, and commercial defense
firms.117 Notable targets were the Ministry of Unification, Korean Institute of Defense
Analysis, and Hyundai Merchant Marine. The operation used a piece of malware called
TROJAN.KIMSUKY that was likely propagated through a spearphishing email.118 The
malware included a payload consisting of a keystroke logger and malicious code
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designed to collect directory listings and ‘.hwp’ documents, as well as provide remote
access. Along with targets limited to only South Korea, the report noted that there were
Korean language characters in the malware and that the IP addresses associated with the
operation originated in China near the border with North Korea. This operation has been
characterized as an APT and referred to Operation Kimsuky.119
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
a keystroke logger (4.5) and was also an APT (5), had a minimal effect (1), was an
individual cyber event that was a nuisance (1), targeted government non-military entities
(2), and had the goal of acquiring target information and data (2). This is summarized in
Table 6 at the end of the section.

August 2014. According to a statement from a national assembly member from
the Land, Infrastructure, and Transportation Committee made on 5 October 2015, citing
the results of a report from the NIS, North Korea was suspected of conducting a cyber
espionage operation against the Seoul Metro from at least March to August 2014 that
exfiltrated information.120 It was confirmed in the report that two servers in charge of
program installation and patch management had been breached, allowing unauthorized
access to at least 213 computers, of which 58 had been infected with malicious code.121
The Seoul Metro discovered the breach in July, after which it shut down the servers and
notified government authorities. The operation exfiltrated several documents but did not
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gain access to central computers or networks with direct operational control over the
metro system. Due to the absence of a log management system, the NIS was able to
secure logs from no earlier than March. Although it was unable to determine the date or
method of initial infiltration, it was suspected to have been before March. This operation
was characterized as an APT.
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
intrusion (3) and was also an APT (5), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber
event that was a nuisance (1), targeted a private entity (1), and had the goal of acquiring
target information and data (2). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section.

November 2014. An offensive cyberspace operation on 24 November against
Sony Pictures Entertainment in the United States disrupted computer and network access,
exfiltrated sensitive information, and destroyed data on 3,262 of its 6,797 computers and
837 of its 1,555 servers.122 The operation used a worm that functioned as a dropper to
deliver a payload of an additional five pieces of malware to include a listener, backdoors,
and wipers.123 The group that claimed to be responsible called itself the Guardians of
Peace and stated that it had conducted the operation response to the planned release of
The Interview, a comedy movie that depicts the assassination of the supreme leader of
North Korea. The group released some of the sensitive information, which included
embarrassing correspondence and confidential personal information of employees, and
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also threatened the release of additional information if the movie was released. 124 The
Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) conducted an investigation and concluded that
North Korea was responsible for the attack. This conclusion was based on several pieces
of evidence:
•

Technical aspects of the malicious code used were similar to malicious code
confirmed to have been developed by North Korea.

•

The source of the operation was traced to several IP addresses associated with
North Korean entities in China.

•

The means and methods of the infiltration were similar to those used against
South Korea in March 2013.125

Some doubted the attribution of the operation to North Korea, noting that Sony
Pictures Entertainment was notorious for its poor network security and was the victim of
24 previous documented incidents.126 However, Director of the FBI James Comey stated
that “I have very high confidence about this attribution, as does the entire intelligence
community.”127
Based on this information, the operation against the United States used the
method of a worm (4.3), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was
a nuisance (1), targeted a private entity (1), and had the goal of disrupting target activity
(1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section.
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December 2014. Korea Hydro and Nuclear Power, a subsidiary of the stateowned Korea Electric Power Corporation in South Korea, reported on 22 December that
a cyber espionage operation exfiltrated sensitive information from the Gori and
Wolseong nuclear power plants, including confidential personal information of
employees, designs and manuals for at least two reactors, and estimates of radiation
exposure among local residents. A user on Twitter who alleged to be from antinuclear
group in Hawaii claimed responsibility for the operation and released some of the
information. The user also threatened to release additional information if three of the
reactors were not shut down by 25 December. After the reactors were not shut down, the
user did release additional information and then demanded money, claiming that other
countries had offered to purchase the designs and manuals for the reactors. The results of
an investigation by the Seoul Central District Prosecutor’s Office implicated North Korea
in the operation after discovering that the malware used was similar in composition and
function to TROJAN.KIMSUKY and tracing the IP addresses associated with the
operation to a city in China near the border with North Korea.128
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
intrusion (3), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was a nuisance
(1), targeted a government non-military entity (2), and had the goal of acquiring target
information and data (1). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section.
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October 2015. The NIS reported on 20 October that throughout September and
October, a cyber espionage operation had exfiltrated government audit information from
the National Assembly and had also targeted the Blue House, Ministry of National
Defense, and Ministry of Unification.129 The computers of three national assembly
members and eleven aides. The operation was attributed to North Korea, noting
similarities in the targets from previous operations.
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
intrusion (3), had a minimal effect (1), was an individual cyber event that was a nuisance
(1), targeted a government non-military entity (2), and had the goal of acquiring target
information and data (2). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section.

February 2016. The National Police Agency reported that a cyber espionage
operation by North Korea had infiltrated 140,000 computers at 160 government
organizations.130 The operation, which started around 20 months earlier in 2014 and was
discovered in February 2016, exfiltrated 42,000 documents, including 40,000 defenserelated documents regarding research and development and manufacturing.131 According
to the report, the operators breached a software management system used by commercial
firms to install, delete, and update software on all devices connected to the network.132
This allowed malicious code that exfiltrated information to be installed. An IP addressed
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used in the operation was traced to North Korea and was identical to an address used in
the March 2016 offensive cyberspace operation. Authorities suspected that the operation
was possibly preparation for a future offensive cyberspace operation.133
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
intrusion (3) and was also an APT (5), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or
military (2), was a series of cyber events that were a nuisance (1), targeted government
(non-military and military) entities (6), and had the goal of acquiring target information
and data (2). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the section.

March 2016. The NIS reported on 7 March that North Korea was suspected in a
series of cyberspace operations in South Korea, including one successful cyber espionage
operation, two successful cyber exploitation operations, and one attempted operation.134
The cyber espionage operation targeted and exfiltrated information from tens of senior
government officials at 14 government organizations via phishing text messages that
were sent to smartphones from February to March.135 The text messages directed users to
domains that downloaded and installed malicious code that granted remote-access to
mobile devices. From those infected, operators were able to exfiltrate voice
communications and text messages, as well as contact information. The cyber
exploitation operations were both discovered in February.136 The first breached the
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internal network of a security software firm that provided protection for internet financial
services and card transactions for millions of users. The second digital certificate of a
firm that also provided security software for internet financial services.
The NIS also reported that spearphishing emails were sent to the email accounts
of railway employees at two regional operators from January to February. 137 The targeted
accounts were closed as soon as the phishing emails were reported. It was suspected yet
unconfirmed that the operation was an attempt to access the railway transport control
system. Although specific evidence was not provided, the NIS claimed that North Korea
was behind all the operations, which was possibly preparation for a future offensive
cyberspace operation.
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
intrusion (3), had a minimal effect (1), was a series of cyber events that were a nuisance
(1), targeted private and government non-military entities (4), and had the goal of
acquiring target information and data (2). This is summarized in Table 6 at the end of the
section.

September 2016. A national assembly member from the National Defense
Committee announced on 1 October that in September, malicious code from a cyber
exploitation operation had been found on a server at the Cyber Command of the Ministry
of National Defense (MND).138 A subsequent report from the MND in December
confirmed that the operation breached a routing sever and infected 3,200 computers with
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malicious code, including 700 computers that were connected to the intranet.139 Although
the server was isolated to prevent further infection, the intranet was breached and
sensitive defense-related documents exfiltrated.140 The source of the operation was traced
to several IP addresses in China associated with North Korea.
Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
intrusion (3), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or military (1), was an
individual cyber event that was a nuisance (1), targeted a government military entity (3),
and had the goal of acquiring target information and data (2). This is summarized in
Table 6 at the end of the section.

February 2017 (WannaCry). A cyber ransom operation emerged in February
that targeted 104 organizations in 31 countries around the world and used ransomware to
extort money from victims.141 Reports from Kaspersky Lab and Symantec claimed that a
group referred to as the Lazarus Group, with which North Korea is suspected of being
associated, was behind the operation. The ransomware and the operation are oftentimes
referred to as WannaCry. Based on an assessment that was not made public, the NSA had
“moderate confidence” that the threat actor behind two versions of WannaCry, the
Lazarus Group, were sponsored by the RGB.142 Both the NSA and FBI also implicated
North Korea in a similar operation involving the high-profile cyber theft of over $81
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million from the account of the Bangladesh Bank at the Federal Reserve Bank of New
York in February 2016.143
According to Kaspersky Lab, the Lazarus Group started operations from at least
2009 and developed the malicious code used for the cyberspace operations in March
2013 and November 2014.144 It was also associated with the development of a backdoor
referred to as HANGMAN that was discovered in September 2015. HANGMAN used a
zero-day exploit in ‘.hwp’ documents145 and contained code that connected to an IP
address for a command and control server used in a variant of a backdoor referred to as
MACKTRUCK. The code for HANGMAN was also similar to a backdoor called
PEACHPIT. Both MACKTRUCK and PEACHPIT are associated with cyberspace
operations by North Korea.146 In addition, the report identified the possible existence of a
unit within the Lazarus Group, referred to as Bluenoroff, that uses backdoors established
through operations by the Lazarus Group for financial gain. Bluenoroff has targeted four
types of organizations in nine countries. These have included (1) financial institutions, (2)
casinos, (3) companies involved in the development of financial trade software, and (4)
businesses associated with cryptocurrency.
According to Symantec, an initial variant of the ransomware that included as
payload two pieces of malware from previous cyberspace operations appeared on 10
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February. 147 BACKDOOR.DESTOVER was used in the offensive cyberspace operation
against Sony Pictures Entertainment in November 2014, and TROJAN.VOLGMER was
used in the cyber espionage operation against South Korea in June 2013. At least one
organization in February and five organizations from March to April were infected with
this variant of the ransomware. The malicious code was propagated within networks
using stolen credentials. On 12 May, the operation expanded as a new variant of the
ransomware appeared that incorporated a zero-day exploit.148 This exploit allowed the
ransomware to propagate at a much faster rate by eliminating the need to steal
credentials. Similarities in TTPs, including shared network infrastructure and shared
malicious code, were cited as evidence connecting this operation to others by the Lazarus
Group.149
The reports from Kaspersky Lab and Symantec represented a coordinated
industry-wide effort, called Operation Blockbuster and announced on 24 February 2016,
to share intelligence and resources and assist commercial and government organizations
in protecting against the Lazarus Group.150 There were several conclusions made based
on this effort:151
•

The scale and sophistication of the operations is beyond that of criminal
organizations and even beyond that of other APT groups.
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•

The human, financial, and technological resources required for this, as well as
the operational errors, indicate that the Lazarus Group is comprised of several
units.

•

The Lazarus Group has been prolific in the development of malware, avoiding
reuse and releasing newer and newer versions.

Based on this information, the operation against South Korea used the method of
a worm (4.3) and was also an APT (5), had an effect on critical national infrastructure or
military (2), and targeted private and government non-military entities. However, the
interaction type and goal type are difficult to assess with this methodology because the
series of events were not part of a cyberspace operation but rather part of a cybercrime.
The assessment is included here because although the cybercrime is normally outside the
scope of activities for a government, North Korea is an exception. This is summarized in
Table 6.

Table 6. Assessment of Cyberspace Operations by North Korea.
DATE
07/2009
01/2011
03/2011
04/2011
03/2013
06/2013
09/2013
08/2014

NATION
South
Korea
United
States
South
Korea
South
Korea
United
States
South
Korea
South
Korea
South
Korea
South
Korea
South
Korea

METHOD

SEVERITY

INTERACTION

TARGET

GOAL

4.3

2

3

3

1

2

1

1

2

1

2

1

1

1

1

2

2

1

2

1

2

1

1

3

1

4.2

1

1

1

1

4.3 (5)

2

5

1

2

2

1

1

2

1

4.5 (5)

1

1

2

2

3 (5)

1

1

1

2
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11/2014
12/2014
10/2015
02/2016
03/2016
09/2016
02/2017

United
States
South
Korea
South
Korea
South
Korea
South
Korea
South
Korea
South
Korea

4.3

1

1

1

1

3

1

1

2

1

3

1

1

2

2

3 (5)

2

1

6

2

3

1

1

4

2

3

2

1

3

2

4.3 (5)

2

X

4

X

Table 7. Valeriano and Maness Assessment of Cyberspace Operations by North Korea.
DATE

NATION

07/2009
01/2011
03/2011
04/2011

South
Korea
United
States
South
Korea
South
Korea
United
States
South
Korea

METHOD

SEVERITY

INTERACTION

TARGET

GOAL

4.2

2

3

2

0

2

1

1

2

0

1

1

1

2

0

2

1

1

1

0

2

1

1

2

0

4.2

1

1

1

0

Cyberspace Operations against North Korea
December 2014. An offensive cyberspace operation against North Korea’s
internet affected access for several days.152 Disruption started on 19 December and
resulted in complete denial on 22 December, with access restored after ten hours. The
operation occurred only hours after President Barak Obama promised a proportional
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response to the offensive cyberspace operation against Sony Pictures Entertainment on 24
November that the FBI attributed to North Korea. The United States government denied
any involvement in the operation. North Korea responded by threating its “toughest
counteraction […] by far surpassing the ‘symmetric counteraction’ declared by
Obama”.153 There were initial suspicions that the event was benign and due to North
Korea itself or even to China, but experts claimed that the event was inconsistent with
activities such as maintenance or repair.154 Because the bandwidth for North Korea is so
low, even a small amount of traffic can overload its internet connection. The event was,
however, consistent with a DDOS operation.
Based on this information, the operation against North Korea used the method of
a denial of service (2), had a minimal effect due to low dependence on the internet (1),
was an individual cyberspace operation that was a nuisance (1), and had the goal of
disrupting target activity (1). As the distinction between private and government in North
Korea is nonexistent and the operation targeted the entire internet, the target is difficult to
assess with this methodology. This is summarized in Table 8 at the end of the section.

May 2015. A report from Reuters claimed that the United States had attempted an
offensive cyberspace operation against North Korea’s nuclear weapon development
program between 2009 and 2010, but was unsuccessful.155 According to the report, the
operation was conducted in tandem with an operation against Iran, referred to as Olympic
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Games, which also targeted its nuclear weapon development program. Olympic Games
used a now infamous piece of malware called Stuxnet that degraded the operation of the
centrifuges used by Iran for uranium enrichment. Among other functions, it damaged or
destroyed the centrifuges by directing the programmable logic controllers to spin beyond
tolerances. Experts speculated that the operation required an unprecedented amount of
human, financial, and technical resources to plan, develop, and execute. Stuxnet is
considered the only confirmed use of malware by a state actor to cause physical damage
against an adversary.
As North Korea and Iran acquired centrifuges from the same source and
cooperated on nuclear weapon development activities, it is likely that the programmable
logic controllers were similar. Therefore, it is also likely that the operation against North
Korea used a variant of Stuxnet. However, there are a few possible reasons that it seems
to not have made an impact on the pace of development. First, the malware might not
have been able to access the systems and networks, which were not connected to the
internet. North Korea has less interaction with foreigners than Iran and thus fewer
opportunities to introduce the malware. There is also less intelligence available about its
development facilities. Second, even if the malware was introduced, North Korea also
uses plutonium, which does not require enrichment.
Based on this information, the operation against North Korea attempted to use the
method of a worm, a variant of Stuxnet, (4.3) that was an APT (5), was an individual
cyberspace operation that was offensive (3), targeted a government military entity (3),
and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). As the operation was unsuccessful, the
severity is not applicable. This is summarized in Table 8 at the end of the section.
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March 2017. An article from the New York Times reported that from 2014, the
United States had conducted offensive cyberspace operations against North Korea’s
ballistic missile program as an alternative to reliance on ballistic missile defense
systems.156 According to the article, the high failure rates during flight tests of
interceptors indicated that these systems were unable to meet the goal of defending the
United States against ballistic missile threats. Statements from officials advocated for the
preemptive use of non-kinetic capabilities, such as cyber and electronic capabilities.
Then, soon after the test detonation of a nuclear device in February 2013 by North Korea,
the United States published Joint Integrated Air and Missile Defense: Vision 2020, which
referenced using “cyberwarfare, directed energy, and electronic attack” capabilities and
“neutralizing an adversary’s offensive air and missile assets prior to use.”157 Throughout
2014 and 2016, the failure rates during flight tests of various ballistic missile systems
were noticeably high.158 All this was cited as evidence for the presence of covert
cyberspace operations.
Others, however, argued that even if the United States had the capability,
correlation did not equal causation.159 It was noted that the failures since 2014 were
limited to four new missile systems that had never been tested, the BM-25 (five failures),
the KN-011 (three failures), an unidentified intercontinental ballistic missile (two
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failures), and an unidentified anti-ship missile (two failures).160 Drawing conclusions
from failure rates is difficult because of the numerous factors that must be considered. It
is possible that the failures were simply the result of a rushed program and limited
resources.
Based on this information and assuming the operation did occur, the operation
against North Korea, had an effect on critical national infrastructure of military (2), was
an individual cyberspace operation that was offensive (3), targeted a government military
entity (3), and had the goal of disrupting target activity (1). There is not enough
information to assess the method used in the operation. This is summarized in Table 8.

Table 8. Assessment of Cyberspace Operations against North Korea.
DATE

NATION

12/2014
05/2015
03/2017

North
Korea
North
Korea
North
Korea

METHOD

SEVERITY

INTERACTION

TARGET

GOAL

2

1

1

X

1

4.3 (5)

X

3

3

1

X

2

3

3

1

Assessment of Cyberspace Capabilities
The initial period of North Korean cyberspace operations from July 2009 to April
2011 was characterized primarily by offensive cyberspace operations (almost all of which
were DDOS operations) of varying scope and severity. There is evidence that these
operations required no more than months by tens of personnel to plan and execute and no
more than a medium level of knowledge or access. In fact, DDOS operations often use
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botnets of infected computers, which do not necessarily require a high level of
commitment or resources to establish. However, by April 2011, the suspected level of
resources that were required had increased relative to previous operations. Because
targets included up to military government entities in South Korea and the United States,
it is assumed that the threat actor was willing accept a high level of associated risk. It was
also able to mostly but not entirely obscure the details of its operations. Although
attempts were made at wiping hard drives, traces of malware were left behind in all
operation Based on these factors, North Korea is assessed at an initial threat level of five
according to OTA as of April 2011, which is summarized in Table 9.

Table 9. North Korean Threat Profile as of April 2011
THREAT PROFILE
THREAT
LEVEL

5

Commitment Attributes

Resource Attributes

Intensity

Stealth

Time

Technical
Personnel

Cyber
Knowledge

Kinetic
Knowledge

Access

H

M

Weeks/Months

Tens

M

M

M

The latest period of North Korean cyberspace operations, those from March 2013
to May 2017,161 has been characterized primarily by cyber espionage. It was from this
period that North Korea began to be considered an APT by experts. The operations had
specific targets associated with the government and critical national infrastructure, used
TTPs that indicated a high degree of organization and high amount of resources, and
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required extended operations and repeated attempts. Analysis and investigation from
almost every subsequent operation has revealed a greater scope and greater intensity of
operations, often requiring tens of tens or even hundreds of personnel and months to
years to plan, develop, and execute. Although there is indication of a high level of cyber
knowledge due to evidence of the internal development and use of sophisticated pieces of
malware (two of which each even incorporated a zero-day exploit) there is no indication
of more than a medium level of kinetic knowledge or access. Based on these factors,
North Korea is assessed at a latest threat level of three according to OTA as of May 2017,
which is summarized in Table 10.

Table 10. North Korean Threat Profile as of May 2017
THREAT PROFILE
THREAT
LEVEL

3

Commitment Attributes

Resource Attributes

Intensity

Stealth

Time

Technical
Personnel

Cyber
Knowledge

Kinetic
Knowledge

Access

H

H

Months/Years

Tens/Tens

H

M

M

In addition to the attributes discussed, OTA also considers the multipliers of
funding, assets, and technology, which potentially enhance capabilities but do not
necessarily increase the threat level. This is because the multipliers can either increase or
decrease certain measures. In the case of North Korea, although the increased amount of
funding and number of assets evidenced by the analysis of offensive cyberspace
operations have provided an increased level of technical personnel and cyber knowledge,
these multipliers also have increased the reliance on resources abroad. This has resulted
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in an increased degree of exposure and therefore a decreased level of stealth. In contrast,
the increased sophistication of technology has resulted in an increased level of access.
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CHAPTER VI: CONCLUSION

Results
In regard to Hypothesis 1, North Korea’s cyberspace resources and capabilities
have increased and have now reached a level that represents an advanced persistent
threat. Its development of civilian cyberspace resources has been cautious yet consistent.
Efforts began in 1990 under the KCC, which has continued and expanded its efforts to
include research and development at nine centers and providing IT services abroad from
offices in China, Japan, and Europe. North Korea now also operates three state-owned IT
ventures and several IT firms.
In 2000, cyberspace in North Korea consisted only of a domestic intranet. By
2002, North Korea had established a mobile network and by 2003, had established an
internet connection. Although little information is available on the latter, the former has
been ungraded from 2G to 3G and expanded from 20,000 to 3 million subscribers. All
this, however, has been accompanied by the development and implementation of
domestic software that provides the government with an unprecedented degree of
monitoring and control.
In addition, North Korea’s development of military capabilities in cyberspace has
been consistent and dramatic. In 2014, it completed the installation of a dedicated highspeed fiber-optic military intranet that allows for integrated command and control
between strategic, operational, and tactical units. It has one confirmed and two suspected
cyber units subordinate to the RGB and two cyber units subordinate to the GSD. North
Korea has also doubled its cyberwarfare personnel from an estimated 3,000 in 2012 to
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6,800 in 2016.162 There are reports that it has 1,200 personnel at covert cyber units in
China and Southeast Asia.163 North Korean cyber units have been implicated in several
high-profile operations, such as the July 2009 DDOS operation, the November 2014
operation against Sony Pictures Entertainment, and WannaCry. Based on a correlation
between the TTPs of North Korean cyberspace operations and these confirmed and
suspected cyber units, it is possible that the Lazarus Group (which was previously and/or
is alternatively referred to as the DarkSeoul Gang) is actually Bureau 121 and Bluenoroff
is actually the subordinate Unit 180.
North Korea possesses a large spectrum of methods used for cyberspace
operations, including the tools of botnets, trojans, viruses, and worms. At least 4 out of 15
operations were targeted and sophisticated enough for the threat actor to be considered an
APT. Regarding the tools, a recent joint technical alert from the FBI and DHS in fact
identified a massive botnet infrastructure that is maintained by North Korea and referred
to as DeltaCharlie.164 The report, which refers to North Korean malicious cyberspace
activity as HIDDEN COBRA, confirms that the “tools and capabilities used by HIDDEN
COBRA actors include DDOS botnets, keyloggers, remote access tools (RATs), and
wiper malware.”165
In light of its overall operations, North Korea’s capabilities can be thought of as
representing a high-level threat according to OTA.166 This places it alongside threats such
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as those represented by the series of offensive cyberspace operations against the Estonian
internet in 2007. There is no evidence, however, that it has acquired the resources (the
attributes of cyber knowledge, kinetic knowledge, and access) required for an operation
such as that against the Iranian uranium enrichment program in 2009 and 2010. Such an
operation can be assigned a threat level of one, which represents the greatest form of
APT.
In regard to Hypothesis 2, despite the increase in cyberspace resources and
capabilities, North Korea’s cyberspace operations have remained restrained (produced
minimal effects on South Korean and United States national security) and regional
(targeted South Korea over the United States). The types of North Korean cyberspace
operations are almost equal in occurrence. Out of 15 operations, 7 were offensive
cyberspace operations and 8 were cyber espionage. Out of 3 operations against the United
States in particular, all were offensive cyberspace operations and none were cyber
espionage. It is also interesting to note that no offensive cyberspace operation has been
conducted against South Korea since June 2013 or against the United States since
November 2014. Although there have been subsequent cyber espionage operations
against South Korea, there have no subsequent cyberspace operations against the United
States.
There are a few possible explanations for this seeming transition from a period of
offensive cyberspace operations to a period of cyber espionage against South Korea. As
mentioned earlier, cyber espionage is often preparation for an offensive cyberspace
operation. Therefore, it is possible that South Korea has improved at discovering this
before the offensive cyberspace operation is executed. This was the suspicion after the
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operation in February 2016 was uncovered. It is also possible that the period of offensive
cyberspace operation was for the testing of capabilities that were to be used for the
eventual and current period of cyber espionage. This is similar to the suspicion that the
operation in March 2011 was for the testing of capabilities and observing of the time
required for the operation to be discovered, analyzed, and mitigated.
The frequency of North Korean cyberspace operations increased in 2011, with
two to three operations conducted or discovered each year since then except for 2012.
Although any connection is speculation, 2012 was the year that Kim Jong-un assumed the
position of supreme leader after his father, Kim Jong-il, died in December 2011. During
this transition, the attention of the leadership was on reestablishing legitimacy and
refocusing power from the military to the ruling party.167
The effects of North Korea’s offensive cyberspace operations and cyber
espionage operations on South Korea and United States national security have been
minimal. The intensity of North Korean cyberspace operations has never exceeded that of
an effect on critical national infrastructure or military and most have been below this,
with 10 of out 17 operations at the intensity of minimal effect. The intensity of operations
against the United States in particular has never exceeded that of a minimal effect.
From the framework of risk, the consequences of these operations can be difficult
to determine and measure. There are likely psychological consequences for most
operations. However, the research on the psychological consequences in relation to cyber
terrorism is limited, and it is unclear whether these cyber incidents can even be
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characterized as cyber terrorism.168 The operational and resultant economic consequences
are easier to measure. During the multiple DDOS operations by North Korea, government
and civilian entities were unable to provide services via the internet for hours or
sometimes even days. This resulted in operating losses, as well as investigation and
remediation costs. The MND estimated that North Korean offensive cyberspace
operations between 2009 and 2013 had cost $805 million.169 Sony Pictures Entertainment
reported that the offensive cyberspace operation in September 2014 had cost $15 million.
Although these figures seem high, the actual economic consequences are low in
comparison to overall national or corporate budgets.170
The focus of North Korean cyberspace operations is overwhelmingly on South
Korea. 12 out of 17 operations have focused on South Korea exclusively, and only 1 out
of 17 operations has focused on the United States exclusively. However, this single event
in November 2014 was instigated by the planned release of a comedy movie by the
United States that offended North Korea. Dissimilar from previous operations against
both South Korea the United States, there was a single target that was unassociated with
the government or military, an articulated personal motive, and a demand to cancel the
release of the movie. This operation was uncharacteristic of most operations by state
actors.
In regard to Hypothesis 3, North Korea’s valuable assets include its ability to
control cyberspace within North Korea and its ability to engage in cyberspace activities
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and operations from abroad. The North Korean government has implemented extreme
measures to ensure control over the flow of information into and within the nation. It has
developed intrusive software (or malware in any context other than the North Korean
government) that monitors and controls activities on almost all devices, systems, and
networks used by its citizens. Although access to these has been increasing, it is still
restricted.
Although cyberspace infrastructure in North Korea has been developing, greater
capacity and greater anonymity is offered by locations abroad. A reported 1,100 out of
6,800 cyberwarfare personnel conduct operations from covert locations abroad. 171 It has
also been reported that 1,000 personnel from the KCC have been sent abroad to earn
money for the regime. 172 As these KCC personnel represent a broad range of IT
experience and expertise and the North Korean government has been implicated in illicit
activities before, it is likely that this earning of money is not entirely benign. As with its
military cyberspace operations existing within an overall national security strategy, this
emphasis on moving activities abroad exists within an economic strategy to circumvent
debilitating sanctions. It is possible that this was the motivation behind the alleged highprofile cybertheft of $81 million from the Bangladesh Bank in February 2016 and
cyberextortion of around $55,000 through the ransomware operation WannaCry in May
2017.

김봉기. “‘北, 최근 청와대·국회 해킹 시도… 국감 자료 빼내가’.” Chosun Ilbo, 21 October 2015.
Web.
171

172

김도형. “北, IT 인력 1500 명 해외 보내 年 4000 만달러 벌어.” DongA Ilbo, 25 August 2016. Web.

79

The incident involving WannaCry in particular highlights another danger posed
by North Korean cyberspace activities in general. There was some speculation that
because this operation was so uncharacteristic of a state actor or even other operations
attributed to North Korea, it was possibly the act of a non-state actor that was simply
associated with or supported by North Korea.173 This introduces the potential for the
proliferation of cyber weapons, either intentionally for financial gain or unintentionally
through the traces of malware and malicious code left behind after an operation. In fact, a
comprehensive report from Hewlett Packard emphasizes the potential for such
proliferation of cyber weapons in light of the past proliferation of kinetic weapon
expertise by North Korea and the current relationships with Russia, China, Iran, and Syria
that involve cyberspace.174 For example, North Korea has relied on China for IT
resources and Russia for cyber training and concluded agreement with Iran in 2012 to
combat “common enemies” in cyberspace and a similar agreement with Syria in 2002.175
On another note, as revealed through the analysis, the characterization of
operations as being “sophisticated” or even a “cyberattack” or a “hack” is often
misleading. At least one of the targets, Sony Pictures Entertainment, had notoriously poor
network security.176 Two of the incidents simply involved attempts at phishing text
messages or emails, most of which were unsuccessful. It is also important to remember

173

Elias, Groll. “Security Firms Tie WannaCry Ransomware to North Korea.” Foreign Policy, 23 May
2017. Web.
174
Hewlett Packard Security Research. Profiling an Enigma: The Mystery of North Korea’s Cyber Threat
Landscape, August 2014. Web.
175
Ibid.
176
Steinberg, Joseph. “Massive Security Breach at Sony – Here's What You Need to Know.” Forbes, 11
December 2014. Web.

80

that sophistication is relative to a particular time. Something that was sophisticated
several years ago is not necessarily sophisticated now.

Counterarguments
There are two main competing arguments regarding the implications of malicious
cyberspace activity. The first argument claims that it represents a nuisance that will
unlikely escalate to an existential threat to national security (cyber threat inflation
theory). The second argument claims that it represents a threat to national security that
will possibly result in serious damage or destruction (cyber threat theory). This thesis
generally supports the former.
That is, although there is little indication of any counterargument by experts that
North Korean cyberspace capabilities have not increased, there is a counterargument that
North Korean cyberspace operations will possibly result in serious damage or destruction
for South Korea and United States. However, this counterargument is unsubstantiated. As
demonstrated by the analysis, North Korean cyberspace operations have been restrained,
never having effects on national security strategy and never having physical
consequences. Even if North Korea does have the capabilities for such escalated
cyberspace operations (and there is no evidence of this), these operations are inconsistent
with its overall military strategy.
In addition to a misunderstanding of North Korean cyberspace capabilities and
intent, some experts have noticed a trend of characterizing all offensive cyberspace
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operations as sophisticated and suspect that it is an attempt to shift the blame for lapses in
cybersecurity practices.177
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CHAPTER VII: DISCUSSION

National Security Implications
The greatest threat from North Korea in cyberspace currently is its capability not
its intent. As mentioned, threat is a combination of capability and intent. North Korea has
demonstrated the capability to conduct offensive cyberspace operations and cyber
espionage against both government and civilian targets. It has also dedicated resources
toward developing and enhancing this capability. However, the operations have been
consistent with an overall military strategy that consists of rhetoric and confrontation that
is below the threshold for an act of war. Cyberwarfare is simply another form of
asymmetric warfare. Even in the most alarmist scenario, if North Korea wanted to cause
damage or destruction to critical infrastructure in South Korea, there is no reason it could
not have done this already through traditional covert means, even despite the benefit of
anonymity offered by cyberspace operations.
North Korea is not the greatest threat to the United States in cyberspace. North
Korea is often referenced along with Russia and China as being among the most serious
threats to the United States in cyberspace. In the assessment of cyberpower, Clark listed it
first among the three nations and Valeriano and Maness listed it third among the three
nations. According to the Worldwide Threat Assessment of the US Intelligence
Community, “[North Korea] probably remains capable and willing to launch disruptive or
destructive offensive cyberspace operations to support its political goals.”178 However, as
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revealed in this thesis, the focus of the operations is South Korea, not the United States,
and the effect of the operations has been limited. In contrast, however, Russia has
demonstrated a willingness to target critical infrastructure in and conduct cyber espionage
operations against the United States, and China as well has been successful in cyber
espionage operations against the United States.179
North Korea’s cyberspace operations (or cyber weapons) are a complement to its
nuclear weapons. The greatest North Korean activities of concern for the United States
are cyberspace operations and nuclear weapon/ballistic missile development. Placing the
threats that the respective weapons represent within an impact/probability chart or matrix,
nuclear weapons exemplify a threat that is high-impact but low-probability, and cyber
weapons exemplify a threat that is low-impact but high-probability. Nuclear weapons
have an enormous destructive force that is kinetic and therefore high impact. However,
because of this and the numerous uncertainties associated with the potential
consequences for the actual use of nuclear weapons (the “threat that leaves something to
chance” in theories of deterrence), they have a low probability of being used.
In contrast, almost all cyber weapons have a damaging or disrupting effect that is
only virtual and therefore low-impact.180 However, because cyber weapons can be used to
effect relatively quickly and anonymously, they have a high probability of being used. It
is therefore reasonable to assume that absent some sort of existential threat, North Korea
will maintain its use of cyberspace operations for OCO and CISR in the virtual world and
its use of nuclear weapons for deterrence in the physical world.
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Because North Korea values its ability to control cyberspace within North Korea
and its ability to engage in cyberspace activities and operations from abroad, these assets
are also valuable targets for the United States. According to an expert on North Korea,
Jieun Baek, “[The erosion of control over information] is probably the biggest weakness
that the government has. And that’s evident because of the way they react to foreign
information coming in, versus other threats like economic sanctions or verbal
condemnations by other countries.”181 Because of its expansive and interconnected
nature, which allows for the greater flow of information, the inability to control
cyberspace represents a serious threat to the North Korean regime. The implications for
even limited (yet legal) means of information flow between North Korean citizens via
even domestic cyberspace, such as mobile phone, are significant. Such means allow for
greater interpersonal communication and the formation of constituencies that are able to
bring pressure on the regime.182 This forces the regime to reconsider its approach of
control through individual isolation and creates the protentional for positive change.183
In addition, there has often been a disconnect between the goals for United States
national security policy regarding North Korea and the instruments of state power that
can be used to achieve these goals. That is, the United States wants North Korea to
abandon its nuclear weapon and ballistic missile development but has relied only on
diplomatic and/or economic instruments, such as negotiations and sanctions. Due to the
physical risks of retaliation and escalation, the traditional military threat cannot be
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addressed with a traditional military response. In contrast, a cyberspace threat has no
such physical risks, and can therefore be addressed with a cyberspace response, as well as
diplomatic and economic responses. Because the locations abroad from which North
Korea engages in cyberspace activities and operations also likely have dual purposes
(economic and military), eliminating the ability to use these locations denies North Korea
the resources and capabilities required to leverage multiple instruments of state power.
For these reasons, the aforementioned assets related to North Korea in cyberspace are
valuable to the United States as potential targets for leveraging its own instruments of
state power to advance its national security and foreign policy goals.

Policy Recommendations
Before offering policy recommendations, it is necessary to review the current
United States strategies related to cyberspace. These can be broadly divided into
diplomatic strategy and military strategy. For the former, according the International
Strategy for Cyberspace released by the White House in 2011:184
The United States will work internationally to promote an open, interoperable,
secure, and reliable information and communications infrastructure that supports
international trade and commerce, strengthens international security, and fosters
free expression and innovation. To achieve that goal, we will build and sustain an
environment in which norms of responsible behavior guide state actions, sustain
partnerships, and support the rule of law in cyberspace.
For the latter, the DOD has declared five strategic goals:185
1. Build and maintain ready forces and capabilities to conduct cyberspace
operations;
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2. Defend the DOD information network, secure DOD data, and mitigate risks to
DOD missions;
3. Be prepared to defend the US homeland and US vital interests from disruptive
or destructive cyberattacks of significant consequence;
4. Build and maintain viable cyber options and plan to use those options to
control conflict escalation and to shape the conflict environment at all stages;
5. Build and maintain robust international alliances and partnerships to deter
shared threats and increase international security and stability.
The United States government should focus on denying and disrupting the use of
cyberspace by covert cyber units outside of North Korea. Because the systems and
networks outside of North Korea are dependent on the use of host nation infrastructure
and compliance with host nation regulation, they are more vulnerable. Because these
locations provide greater capacity and anonymity, they also are likely more valuable to
the North Korea regime. There are two options suggested for this denial and disruption.
The first is directly through offensive cyberspace operations, which would neutralize a
node from the network of units that support the system of cyberspace operations. The
second is indirectly through the conclusion of an agreement or a treaty that codifies
international norms prohibiting the conduct of certain types of operations against certain
types of targets, which would neutralize the node by obligating the host nation to address
cyber harm emanating from within its territory. Even if the node is not neutralized due to
the inability or unwillingness of the host nation, an agreement or a treaty at least alters
the properties of the system of regulations and creates a difficult operating environment
for the unit. These two options are potentially mutually exclusive.
A response has already been made against North Korean cyberspace assets, albeit
in the context of counterproliferation. In June 2017, the Office of Foreign Assets Control
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at the Department of the Treasury added the KCC to the list of designation entities for
sanctions due its role in earning foreign money for the regime and the Munitions Industry
Department in particular, which is involved in key aspects of the ballistic missile
development program.186 As such, expanding sanctions to include any North Korean
entity associated with malicious cyberspace activities or operations represents a third
option.
The United States government should focus on enabling and ensuring the less
monitored and less controlled use of cyberspace by civilians inside of North Korea.
Cyberspace operations against strategic programs have been unsuccessful at noticeably
deterring or even delaying the progression of these programs. This does not mean,
however, that North Korea is invulnerable to such operations. It means only that those
specific programs are. The aforementioned vulnerability to information other than statesanctioned media has already been exploited for use by the human network of illicit
storage mediums that are smuggled into and out of North Korea. Assuming that a greater
flow of information equates to a greater chance for change in regime behavior, the asset
of monitoring and control is worth targeting. Providing access to information could be
accomplished by supporting the efforts of non-governmental organizations to get
CDs/DVDs, USB flash drives, and SD cards into North Korea. This access could then be
assured by initiating efforts to defeat or circumvent the software placed on the devices,
systems, and networks by the North Korean government.
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Such cyberspace operations could even occur within a more comprehensive and
more active information operation campaign. After the flow of and access to information
has been increased in North Korea, the United States could release public information
that is truthful yet damaging to the legitimacy and credibility of the regime. The duration
and intensity of this campaign could be tailored to act either as a means of deterrence in
cyberspace, signaling the capability of the United States to disrupt regime control, or as a
means of destabilization.
The United States government should enhance information and intelligence
sharing with allies and partners, as well as with civilian entities. As revealed in the
analysis of cyberspace operations by North Korea, the threat is comprised of multiple
pieces of a puzzle. Different pieces of evidence can be left behind on different private and
government systems and networks. Different series of operations against private and
government targets in the United States and other countries can be connected to reveal a
greater scope and intensity that is otherwise not obvious from an individual operation. It
is all this evidence that completes the puzzle of the actual cyberspace capabilities and
intent of an adversary.
Some executive efforts to enhance information and intelligence sharing have been
made. For example, The DHS established the United States Computer Emergency
Readiness Team (US-CERT) in 2003 to collect, analyze, and disseminate cybersecurity
information shared among private and government entities. However, legislative efforts
have lagged. The Cyber Intelligence Sharing and Protection Act (CISPA) passed the
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House of Representatives but not the Senate in 2013.187 Despite concerns over liability
and anonymity, the alternate Cybersecurity Information Sharing Act (CISA) was signed
into law in 2015. However, although CISA facilitates information sharing, it does not
require information sharing. There are also no provisions in executive agreements or
treaties or in legislative acts that establish means of or obligation for information and
intelligence sharing between allies and partners. These are significant missing pieces of
the puzzle that need to be addressed.

Directions for Future Research
There are three directions for future research that are best captured in the
following questions: (1) What are the nuanced differences in effects or consequences
between exploitative cyber incidents and disruptive cyber incidents? (2) How does the
analysis of cyber events in this thesis compare to the analysis in the updated DCIDD
expected to be released soon after the thesis is completed? What are the implications for
national security if North Korea is engaged in cybercrime?
As mentioned earlier, exploitative incidents and disruptive incidents differ in
regard to ultimate effect. However, this is not reflected in the factor of severity in the
DCIDD. If the ultimate consequence is different, then is it reasonable to assume that the
implication for national security will be different. Recognizing the importance of this
distinction, the Center for International and Security Studies at Maryland has published a
framework for categorizing and assessing the severity of disruptive cyber incidents and is
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finalizing a separate framework for exploitative cyber incidents.188 It is also worth
considering consequences that are not only operational or economic (as was done in this
thesis), but also psychological. That is, do North Korean cyberspace operations have
consequences that are psychological and what are the implications for national security?
Of the fourteen dyadic cyber events in the DCIDD that identified North Korea as
the perpetrator, seven were unable to be found and one was omitted because although the
indicated event did occur, no confirmation was found for one of the three targets. In
addition to these discrepancies, for the remaining six dyadic cyber events that overlapped
between the DCIDD and this thesis, there were minor discrepancies for the coding of
some of the factors. Because of this, it possible that there will be similar discrepancies in
comparison to the updated DCIDD that are worth addressing.
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